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Abstract 
In November of 2006, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Norway 
launched a bond in the international capital markets for the purpose of funding 
immunization programs in the developing world. This was the first financial 
instrument launched under a structure designed to access donor country aid pledges 
through 2026 up front. US$1 billion of approximately US$5 billion in total pledges was 
monetized in order to be administered by an entity formerly know as the Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (currently known as the GAVI Alliance). 
Over the next several years, additional bonds may be launched under this structure, 
making available almost the full amount of pledges in large amounts early on, rather 
than in much smaller amounts over the course of the next 20 years. With these 
“frontloaded” large pools of funds, GAVI immunization programs, in theory and in 
likelihood, can be more comprehensive and have a far deeper impact on the health 
and development of the world’s poor, particularly children. Such a capital markets 
based approach to development financing is both strikingly innovative in its 
conception and bold in its execution. All parties involved, particularly the United 
Kingdom as the driving force behind this endeavor, deserve substantial recognition 
for their pioneering efforts. 
However, there is an element of International Monetary Fund (IMF)-related 
conditionality within the structure of the instrument that potentially undermines the 
intended purpose of this instrument and may be in conflict with the human rights 
obligations of the UK and the other donor countries involved. Essentially, because of 
the conditions within the financing structure, nations that are not part of the IMF 
(such as, currently, Cuba and North Korea) and those in Protracted Arrears to the IMF 
(such as, currently, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe and, until recently, Liberia) are 
precluded from accessing IFFIm “frontloaded” pledges to fund GAVI immunization 
programs in their countries.  
 2 
The populations of these nations comprise up to 100 million of the world’s poorest 
and most destitute, including, and perhaps especially, children. As a result of this 
conditionality structure, these populations are essentially being locked out of the 20 
years’ worth of immunization aid which this structure frontloads. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the nascent nexus between the international 
capital markets and the human rights obligations of developed nations and other 
actors. Only sovereign nations can and have formally undertaken human rights 
related obligations vis-à-vis their own citizens/inhabitants and certain other 
extraterritorial impacts of their actions. In the context of globalization (particularly 
given the breadth and depth of reach of financial globalization), the informal or 
baseline obligations of non-sovereign actors is also explored. This thesis reviews the 
intent and obligations of the parties involved in the structuring and execution of this 
financial instrument based on available documentation as well as independent 
inquiry. The thesis further explores whether and to what extent the structural 
elements of this financing mechanism undermine any human rights related 
obligations of the involved parties. Further, the paper suggests practical 
recommendations (both short and long term) as potential remedies and/or 
improvements upon the current structure.  
In addition, this thesis seeks to highlight certain trends that may require further 
consideration, and that are likely to surface with increasing frequency, as nations with 
human rights related obligations act in concert with and through agents, instruments 
and markets that are simultaneously of crucial importance to the individual, but are 
also largely devoid of the responsibility to respect, protect or fulfil that individual’s 
human rights. 
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end of 2007. Because large parts of my thesis were written prior to these 
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developments, Liberia continues to figure throughout the document as a nation 
excluded from the scope of the IFFIm structure. One would have hoped that the 
Herculean acts of international activism, financial structuring and far-reaching 
compliance with IMF policies and procedures that ended Liberia’s irregular status 
with the IMF would not have to be a precondition for its impoverished children to 
receive IFFIm funded immunization aid. 
It is my hope that certain elements in the IFFIm structure be realigned to match the 
intended purpose of the instrument. The Donor Countries involved in this structure 
should be reminded of their international human rights responsibilities and 
obligations towards the poorest and most vulnerable. It would be tragic for such 
funding innovation to remain needlessly marred and for the world’s most 
disenfranchised men, women and children to be further excluded from large pools of 
available development aid.  
 
Beatriz Malo de Molina 
Oslo, May 2008 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The human rights implications of international engagement by governments outside 
of their own territories has been a source of much recent research and debate. Such 
extraterritorial obligations are being explored as they relate to wartime actions, 
economic sanctions, the parameters of technical cooperation and assistance, as well as 
obligations relating to development aid and governments’ roles in international and 
multilateral organizations. The human rights obligations of international agencies 
comprising or including substantial government participation are also an area of 
current study. In particular, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and its treaty body (CESCR), as well as the UN Charter 
(particularly articles 55 & 56) and its bodies, and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights have been the sources and focus of much of the legal and moral framework for 
this ongoing analysis.  
International engagement is crucial in the effort to achieve the U.N. Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Yet any hope of achieving the MDGs will require not 
only the world’s concerted focus, but the world’s concerted capital. To date, 
conventional bilateral and multilateral aid has not succeeded in making the kind of 
impact that will lead to MDG success. Utilizing the international capital markets to 
access very large pools of capital is a uniquely appropriate source of funding for these 
ambitious targets. 
This paper is an effort to link the pre-existing human rights obligations of 
governments to the structure of a capital markets financing instrument designed to 
frontload immunization aid funds supporting MDGs 4, 5 and 6 (the IFFIm). 
Particularly the conditionality aspect included in the IFFIm structure presents 
potential conflicts with the human rights obligations of the donor countries involved. 
Therefore, this paper conducts research into the background, preparatory work and 
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execution of the IFFIm in order to explore the context, motivation and levels 
responsibility of the parties involved. 
Questions to be addressed through the research include: What was the intent of the 
actors involved in the IFFIm? Which actors have formal or informal human rights 
obligations? Do some of the structural elements of the IFFIm undermine these duties? 
Do the effects of the structure amount to discrimination based on government 
viability? Can these elements be amended and the issues resolved or improved? 
1.2 Methodology & Thesis Structure 
This paper applies policy-oriented jurisprudence methodology1: mapping out content 
(participants, perspectives, base values, strategies and outcomes) as well as procedure 
(clarification & specification of goals, identification of conflicting claims, past trends in 
decision & conditioning factors, projection of future trends and alternatives & 
recommendations in the global common interest) as they relate to the IFFIm.  
This first section provides an overview of the thesis structure as follows: 
In the second section, Background & Context, financial globalization is discussed, 
highlighting its pervasive nature, importance and impact on today’s world. 
International finance can hardly be seen to be an area apart from other areas of human 
activity, since the infrastructure that has been created to permit and encourage 
international capital flows reaches or impacts virtually everyone. The IFFIm structure 
is placed within that background, as an innovative structure through which the 
established international financial infrastructure can be leveraged to the benefit of 
development and aid related activities. The troublesome aspects of IMF-related 
conditionality within the IFFIm structure are also explored, given that they result in 
                                                
1
 Wiessner and Willard (1999) p.334. 
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the exclusion of up to 100 million2 of the world’s poorest populations from the 
important and dynamic efforts of the GAVI Alliance. 
The third section, Perspectives on Motivation, Intent & Expectations, explores the intent 
of the various parties involved in the creation, structuring and execution of the IFFIm. 
There is a particular focus on the intentions of the donor countries involved and in 
particular the UK, given that its leadership role behind this innovative structure. This 
concludes that Donor Country intent was to arrive at a mechanism for maximizing the 
impact of their immunization related aid, though certain accounting principles played 
a pivotal role in structuring. While the motivations of other actors involved were 
perhaps more purpose-driven, none of the actors can be said to have motives that 
sought to undermine the noble intentions of the UK government. 
The fourth section, Participants’ Human Rights Obligations, reviews the formal, legal 
and/or moral obligations of the different IFFIm actors. Again, the principal focus is on 
human rights related obligations, including extraterritorial and other related aspects. 
The areas of international assistance & cooperation, non-discrimination, due diligence, 
conditionality & disintermediation and aggregation are explored. Particular focus is 
given to the concepts of disintermediation (the capital markets replacing traditional 
donor-recipient negotiations) and aggregation (the broader impact of state actions on 
the rights of entire populations, rather than on the rights of individuals or 
groups/peoples within nation states). Both concepts are found to be insufficiently 
treated in current human rights discourse, but may become increasingly relevant as 
global financial architecture is utilized to support/fund international development aid. 
In the fifth section, Overview of Program Functions & Governance, the configuration of 
the IFFIm as well as the interactions that the various actors have within that structure 
are reviewed. The purpose of this section is to clarify the roles of the various actors 
                                                
2
 CIA World Factbook (July 2008 est.); the populations of Somalia: 9.6 million and Zimbabwe: 12.4 million - are 
noted as particularly difficult to estimate given refugee movements resulting from famine and warfare, as well as 
the effect of AIDS. Cuba: 11.4 million, North Korea: 23.5 million, Liberia: 3.3 million, Sudan: 40.2 million. 
 8 
and the timing elements that can be important for determining responsibilities and 
potential areas of conflict. 
The sixth section, Identification of Conflicts, is a schematic overview of participants’ 
interactions, intents, obligations and approaches. This section seeks to highlight the 
principal areas of conflict between participants’ human rights related obligations and 
their actions within the IFFIm construct. 
Finally, the section titled Conclusions: Alternatives & Recommendations, outlines in 
summary two short term and two long term recommendations aimed at redressing 
the IFFIm structure and encouraging the interaction between the capital markets and 
philanthropic investment. 
1.3 Update 
Important developments, including the issuance of bonds under the IFFIm structure 
in the Japanese market and the regularization of Liberia’s relationship with the IMF, 
occurred in March 2008. In April, IFFIm’s Chairman told Reuters that the IFFIm 
structure could find other applications, such as ‘clean-water bonds’ to build wells or 
pipes and that additional IFFIm bonds were likely to be issued in Europe within 2008. 
To the extent possible, these updates have been included either in the body of the text 
or in footnotes. Largely, however, the thesis is written from the perspective and about 
the situation at year end 2007. On the one hand, this author wishes that all data in this 
paper were rigorously up-to-date. On the other, it is bracing to see that the topic of 
this thesis is the subject of such dynamic focus and engagement. 
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2. Background & Context 
2.1 Financial Globalization and its Development Impact 
The past twenty years have seen the increasing globalization of the world’s financial 
systems. This change has occurred with increasing velocity and has linked developing 
and developed economies in ways that are still being analyzed and understood. While 
a globalized financial system would theoretically optimize capital and risk allocation, 
and facilitate the spread of financial know-how and access to capital to even the 
smallest economies, serious concerns regarding financial globalization persist. Capital 
flight and concentration (from developing nations to principally the US), potential 
contagion from downturns in a global industry or commodity (rather than pure 
correlation to domestic economic performance), systemic shocks with wide-ranging 
knock-on effects (such as those related to sub-prime mortgages currently) and 
increased foreign ownership of large domestic banks and financial institutions are 
only some of the potential risks of the globalization trend.3 
The generally held view within human rights academia holds that the globalization of 
international trade and finance is primarily influenced by the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (together, the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs)4) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)5. While this view can be 
                                                
3
 Bank for International Settlements (2006) and (2008). 
4
 This definition typically includes all World Bank institutions (namely, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development – IBRD – and the International Development Association – IDA) and affiliates 
(namely, the International Finance Corporation – IFC – , the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency – MIGA 
– and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes – ICSID) as well as the IMF. The IBRD 
(also generally referred to as the World Bank) was established at the July 1944 Bretton Woods Conference 
together with the IMF. The IBRD’s purpose post WWII rebuild: earliest recipients were the European countries 
and Japan. By the early 1960s, these countries no longer needed World Bank assistance, and lending was 
redirected to the newly independent and emerging nations of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, 
and, in the 1990s, to the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The IMF and the World Bank 
complement each other's work: the IMF focuses primarily on macroeconomic and financial sector issues, while 
the World Bank focuses primarily on longer-term development and poverty reduction. Its loans finance 
infrastructure projects, the reform of particular sectors of the economy, and broader structural reforms. Countries 
must join the IMF to be eligible for World Bank membership. Sources: http://www.worldbank.org/ and 
http://www.imf.org/external/. 
5
 Salomon (2007) p.8: “…the internationalization of global trade and finance, the enhanced role, and influence, of 
international institutions at the forefront of which are the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO… [through which] 
much of the agenda of economic restructuring, and of deregulated multinational capitalism, is being pursued…”. 
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convincingly contested and qualified6, particularly the work of Erica Gould (2006) 
detailing the significant influence of supplementary financiers on the IMF is of 
relevance, the fact remains that other much larger and more pervasive financial 
entities also significantly impact the lives of individuals worldwide, either directly 
(through lending) or indirectly (through their role in the macroeconomic and financial 
development of a particular country or region, including its exchange rate, 
commodity prices, etc.).  
Any discussion regarding human rights and finance must not discount or exclude the 
extraordinary influence and impact of the vast number of International Financial 
Actors (IFAs)7 who participate daily and actively in financial globalization. IFAs, 
through their lending policies (project finance, inter-bank loans, corporate lending, or 
consumer loans and mortgages), trading and hedging practices (foreign exchange, 
equity indices, single equities, credit, interest rates, commodities, etc.) and 
securitization activities (creation of financial and derivative instruments or contracts 
for the purposes of risk trading, hedging, arbitrage and/or speculation) have a 
                                                                                                                                                      
See also Salomon, et al. (2007) p.20: ‘There are few areas that impact more profoundly on the ability of people in 
remote places to exercise their human rights than those addressed by the work of international economic 
organizations… the Bretton Woods institutions are today inextricably tied up with the ability of people in poor 
countries to exercise their basic human rights.’ See also Asbjørn Eide Human Rights Based Development in the 
Age of Economic Globalization in Andreassen, et al (2006) p.231: “If the IMF finds that a developing country’s 
macroeconomic policy is not sufficiently disciplined, potential private investors are likely to abstain from 
investing there”. 
6
 Center for Global Development website at http://www.cgdev.org/section/topics/ifi/ “While [IFIs] influence on 
development outcomes is often less than their more virulent critics contend, nonetheless it can be quite 
substantial, especially in smaller low-income countries.” (emphasis added). Accessed March 2008. 
7
 For the purposes of this paper, IFAs will refer both to IFIs as well as central banks, large commercial banks 
(Citigroup, HSBC, Bank of America, UBS, Société Générale, Mizuho Financial Group, Santander Central 
Hispano, Crédit Agricole, Royal Bank of Scotland, and similar) and large global investment banks and broker-
dealers (Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, and similar) and non-
bank entities (ie, lenders not affiliated with banks, such as mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, 
hedge funds and similar). The global activities and interests of IFAs broadly defined can and do have significant 
influence, power and ability to impact domestic economies and individuals. The recent U.S. sub-prime real estate 
mortgage crisis and its repercussions on IFAs, investors, homeowners, and general economic confidence 
worldwide is an example of the important impact and influence of non-Bretton Woods financial institutions. The 
foreign exchange trading and hedging activities of IFAs before and during the several currency crises at the end of 
the 20th century (Mexico, Thailand, Russia, etc) can also be said to have impacted the wellbeing of millions of 
non-financial actors (i.e. individuals not directly participating in global financial markets). This definition is 
different than Gould’s (2006) p. 17 definition of supplementary financiers in that a) it excludes creditor states and 
multilateral organizations; and b) Gould’s concept of private financial institutions (PFIs) is expanded to include 
financial institutions with significant government ownership, either domestic or foreign, given that many 
investment banks and other IFAs have historically or recently been owned to a material extent by governments 
directly or though government-controlled investment funds. 
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considerable impact on global development and the lives of many individuals, both in 
the developed and in the developing world. 
The number and value of financial transactions that occur on a daily basis globally is 
nearly unfathomable. Average daily turnover in April 2007 in the foreign exchange 
market alone exceeded US$3 trillion, over the counter (OTC) open positions in interest 
rate risk hedges alone reached US$389 trillion every day on average during June 2007 
and total OTC open positions were closer to US$516 trillion daily. Looking at 
quarterly data, emerging markets received an “unprecedented flow of bank credit,” 
growing by US$201 billion in the quarter ended June 2007 after a record-setting first 
quarter of 2007, with half of these funds going to emerging Europe and US$32 billion 
destined for Africa and the Middle East8. All of these financial activities either directly 
or indirectly affect the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of millions of individuals, as 
well as the general economic climate and possibilities of entire nations.  
Unfortunately, the human rights obligations of the institutions engaging in these 
activities are unclear at best, and are most likely non-existent. The only human rights 
focus related to this very tangible globalization activity comes (or should come) from 
the regulatory oversight role of States and multi-lateral organizations. Given the lack 
of direct obligations at all other levels, it is highly unlikely that there is a satisfactory 
amount of focus on the human rights impact of this vast financial and economic 
activity. Indeed, the shortcomings of financial and trade globalization and of the 
capital markets in general are often much-maligned in the human rights and 
development discourse, despite the fact that the manifold benefits of globalization 
cannot be denied9. 
A global trend towards a market-based system of financing is what has enabled a 
structure such as the IFFIm to be developed and successfully executed. While the 
human rights discourse is almost entirely lacking in the oversight and regulation of 
                                                
8
 Bank for International Settlements (2007); (1 billion = 1 thousand million; 1 trillion = 1 thousand billion). 
9
 See for example Siqqid Osmani Globalization and the Human Rights Based Approach to Development in 
Andreassen, et al (2006) pp.266-268 and Howard-Hassmann (2005) pp.14-16 and pp.20-27.. 
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global capital markets, global capital markets financing practice is marked by certain 
inherent characteristics that can have a positive impact on development in general. 
The fairly uniform standards of disclosure, documentation, as well as the central 
bank, legal, financial and rating agency review that are the hallmarks of the capital 
markets have the benefit of providing greater overall transparency both to regulators 
and to the public. This heightened, periodic and more detailed level of disclosure 
dovetails nicely with the fundamental accountability requirement of human rights 
based approach to development. As Philip Alston states, “[i]nstitutionalized 
arrangements for monitoring processes and outcomes and for establishing some form 
of accountability are indispensable in any human rights context” and “[a]ccountability 
mechanisms are the sine qua non of a Human Rights Approach”10.  
While vaccination levels, immunization rates and other health indicators arguably 
lend themselves well to the analytical and methodological bent of financial actors, the 
IFFIm could become the first of future mechanisms through which similarly 
quantifiable development work (such as clean-water infrastructure projects in 
developing countries)11, or other MDGs, could be financed. These efforts would 
necessarily then be subject to regular and standardized reporting, monitoring and 
public scrutiny. Indeed, the IFFIm is regarded as a “test case” for an International 
Finance Facility (IFF) through which development aid to developing countries could 
be channelled12. While the IFFIm structure currently has approximately US$5 billion 
in pledges (bonds outstanding currently total US$1.2 billion), estimates on the total 
potential size of a larger IFF range from US$300 to US$500 billion. 
The nature of the international capital markets is such that international investors, 
operating from many different parts of the world, must be able to receive and analyze 
the structural and financial information related to a particular security without 
material misstatements or omissions. The documentation standard for debt securities 
                                                
10
 Alston (2005) p.813. 
11
 Macinnis (2008) 
12
 Eurostat CMFB (2005) p.1. Confirmed in several personal communications. 
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in the capital markets is familiar to the banks, broker/dealers, investors and other IFAs 
that have been the driving force of financial globalization described above. By way of 
comparison, privately negotiated loans, and any conditions or covenants agreed to 
between borrowers and lenders (whether these be IMF loans or loans between banks 
and individuals) are not fully available for public scrutiny or review if they remain 
outside the capital markets13.  
Enhanced public disclosure, greater information flows, and the adoption of 
international principles and standards are positive elements that lead to an increased 
ability to supervise and create a “macroprudential regulatory framework”14. These 
standards can also aid in the monitoring and prevention of human rights abuses that 
can be caused, supported or perpetuated by financial transactions. Typically, it is 
useful when attempting to pinpoint the source of human wrongdoings to be guided 
by the principle of “follow the cash.” To the extent that the world’s financial 
operations are joined up in the globalized capital markets, this task becomes easier. 
Putting the role of IFIs into this context is important: as of January 2008, the IMF had 
total loans outstanding of US$15 billion to 68 countries; the World Bank circa US$30 
billion. While the endeavours of IFIs are clearly dwarfed by the overall scale and 
scope of daily IFA activity, the historical role and moral authority of these institutions 
lends disproportionate weight to their pronouncements, decisions, activities and, 
more controversially, conditionality packages. Erica Gould’s 2006 work also cautions 
against placing too much stock in the IMF as a driver, rather than a facilitator, of 
international financial flows, and clearly states that “[t]he Fund often provides only a 
                                                
13
 IMF (2008) seeks a “balance between transparency and confidentiality… [and] the possibility for members to 
request deletions of highly market-sensitive material.” Nevertheless, the report demonstrates a drop of disclosure 
across all report types, with 20% of countries choosing not to publish the key Article IV and Use of Funds 
Resources (UFR) reports, and fully 60% choosing not to publish their Financial System Stability Assessment 
(FSSA) reports, and 31% choosing not to publish Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and related reports. 
No progress in reducing lags in publication times, substantial deletions relating to foreign exchange and/or 
financial system topics in published Article IV reports (on average 11% of these reports contained deletions) and 
postponement by one year of the IMF’s review of its transparency policy has prompted a reaction from civil 
service watchdogs www.freedominfo.org and the Global Transparency Initiative. Gould (2006) p.211 also 
mentions challenges in accessing IMF information for her research. 
14
 See Zdenek Tuma (Governor, Czech National Bank) Financial Globalisation and Financial Stability in Bank 
for International Settlements (December 2006) pp.46-53. 
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fraction of the amount of money that a country needs…”. Indeed, this is also a very 
small, and decreasing, fraction of global financial activity. 
Figure 1: IMF Credit Outstanding in SDR billions15 
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As a result, calls to review the relevance and future roles of the Bretton-Woods 
institutions are increasing in both number and intensity.16 One might argue that the 
IFIs have in essence become the lender of last resort to those nations unable to gain a 
steady foothold in the globalized financial system. These are the nations on the brink 
of being left behind and outside the system, either on a temporary or on a permanent 
basis. The “gradual shift from the government-dominated system of the Bretton 
Woods tradition to a market-led system… [and] gradual shift from bank-centered to 
market-based financing”17 indeed raises the question: if the IFIs, largely on the back of 
a moral standing that far exceeds their actual financial wherewithal or impact are 
bankers to the poorest and most disenfranchised nations, and specific details of their 
financial agreements are not available for public or regulatory scrutiny, should they 
not have an even greater moral imperative to safeguard and defend human rights? 
While the debate surrounding the human rights obligations of IFIs, explored in 
greater detail in a subsequent section of this paper, has recently generated volumes of 
                                                
15
 Source IMF at http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extcred1.aspx , SDR exchange rates at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_mth.aspx?SelectDate=2008-01-31&reportType=SDRCV  
16
 See Raghuram Rajan (Economic Counselor and Director of Research, IMF) The IMF in a Changing World in 
Bank for International Settlements (2006) pp.37-45. 
17
 Several other contributors to Bank for International Settlements (2006), including C. Cumming (First Vice 
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York), Prof. D.T. Llewellyn (Loughborough University) and Z. Tuma, 
referenced this trend in their contributions to the paper. 
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discourse18, it becomes all the more critical given the confluence of factors that affect 
the IFFIm. The Programme is the meeting point of the interests, intents and 
obligations of sovereign states (both donor and recipient), IFAs, IFIs, development (in 
the form of MDGs), human rights19 and the global capital markets. Because the IFFIm 
is an example of what future development funding could look like in the context of a 
globalized financial system, ensuring a precise and defensible alignment of intent, 
obligations and execution is critical. 
2.2 The IFFIm and GAVI Activities in Brief 
In November 2006, US$1 billion in 5-year 5% coupon Notes due November 2011 
(hereafter “IFFIm Notes” or the “Notes”) were successfully issued in the capital 
markets under the Global Debt Issuance Programme (the “Programme”) for the 
International Finance Facility for Immunization (the “IFFIm”)20. The IFFIm was 
originally proposed to the Group of Seven (G7) countries by the UK government in 
2005 as a structure whereby donor governments could make 10-20 year, legally-
binding aid commitments and these pledges could then be securitized in the 
international capital markets and thereby be made available up front.  
The Notes are the first to be issued under this innovative mechanism for financing 
development work and, generally, this is a watershed event in bringing capital 
markets efficiency directly to bear on development efforts to benefit the poor, 
particularly children. As mentioned earlier, the IFFIm is seen as a test case for a much 
larger IFF facility dedicated to providing aid to developing countries or for other 
types of aid bonds (such as clean-water infrastructure, for example). 
The Programme is a legal documentation framework under which multiple bonds or 
notes can be issued over time and these Notes were the first of a series expected to be 
issued. US$5 billion of legally-binding pledges (to be paid out in installments mostly 
                                                
18
 See among others: Salomon (2007), Salomon, et al. (eds.) (2007), Skogly (2001), and Skogly (2006). 
19
 Alston (2005) 
20
 Offering Memorandum, cover. 
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over the course of 15 to 20 years from the date of issuance) have been made by the 
governments of the United Kingdom (GBP1,380 million), France (EUR1,240 million), 
Italy (EUR473 million), Spain (EUR190 million), Sweden (SEK276 million), and 
Norway (US$27 million over five years). The governments of South Africa and of 
Brazil also joined the Facility in March 2007 (US$20 million each), (together, the 
“Grantors” or “Donor Countries”). In January 2008, the GAVI Alliance, the World 
Bank and Daiwa Securities announced that they would be issuing additional notes 
during the first quarter of 2008 to target mainly Japanese investors (marketing and 
press materials termed the notes “Vaccine Bonds”). Approximately US$223 million 
worth of Vaccine Bonds were issued in the Japanese market in March 200821. Recently, 
Alan Gillespie, Chairman of the IFFIm, told Reuters that the IFFIm plans to float 
another bond for in the European market in “mid- to late 2008.” The remaining 
balance (approx. US$3 billion) is expected to be issued by 2015. The current schedule 
of payments and frontloaded disbursements is as follows: 
Figure 2: Expected Donor Country Schedule of Payments and IFFIm Disbursements22 
 
Depending on the market and investor reception of these bonds (which to date has 
been “enthusiastic”), on increased awareness of GAVI’s programs, on successful 
future marketing of “Vaccine Bonds”, and on any additional or increased donor 
pledges, there is no theoretical upper limit to the amounts that could be raised under 
this structure. Indeed, some GAVI presentations have US$10 to US$20 billion as target 
pledge amounts under the IFFIm. In Allan Gillespie’s view, the capital markets would 
                                                
21
 Press release dated 04 March 2008 at http://www.iff-immunisation.org/pdfs/pr_3_04_2008.pdf.  
22
 Source: IFFIm PowerPoint Presentation (February 2007). Donor cash flows have increased since this date. 
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not have any trouble digesting these amounts: “The investor interest is there. The only 
limiting factor right now is the amount of money we need.”23 
Proceeds from the IFFIm Notes are utilized for the purpose of funding vaccination 
projects, focused primarily on the world’s poorest countries24. Funding of these 
projects takes place within a specific framework of project applications and approvals, 
the conditions of which are stipulated in the Programme documentation25. All 
vaccination programs to be funded by IFFIm Notes proceeds are administered by the 
GAVI Alliance, a public-private partnership formerly known as the Global Alliance 
for Vaccines and Immunization (“GAVI”)26. Of the US$1 billion raised in November 
2006, US$994.7 million had already been given GAVI Board approval and had been 
allocated to specific programmes, and US$836 million had been disbursed by GAVI to 
developing countries by December 200727.  
The World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, the World Bank, the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation (initial donors creating GAVI’s US Fund in 1999), the International 
Pediatric Association, public health institutes, vaccine industry representatives and 
other high-level advocates and professionals are an integral part of GAVI’s 
partnership structure. Under GAVI’s coordination (the GAVI Secretariat is currently 
based in Geneva and is hosted by UNICEF), UN entities, civil service organizations in 
the recipient nations, the international donor community, NGOs, research institutions 
and the private and business sector collaborate toward the implementation of 
vaccination programs in the world’s poorest countries. GAVI’s role is to receive, 
approve and fund project proposals, and to coordinate field support of the 
                                                
23
 Macinnis (2008) 
24
 Source: GAVI website at http://www.gavialliance.org.   
25
 Offering Memorandum (2006) p. 14 and p.89 
26
 It is important to note that there are several GAVI entities, including the GAVI Alliance (Geneva, CH – hosted 
by UNICEF) which serves as Secretariat and headquarters, as well as the GAVI Fund (Washington D.C., USA) 
and the GAVI Fund Affiliate (London, UK), both of which are primarily focused on the disbursement of funds to 
approved projects. Currently, there is much discussion internally within GAVI regarding the optimal constellation 
of these entities, including most efficient (from a tax, cost and operating perspective) headquarters and domicile 
for GAVI. In this paper, the term GAVI will be used to refer to the alliance as a whole, and the specific GAVI 
entity will be named only if required to elucidate a specific point. 
27
 Press release at http://www.gavialliance.org/media_centre/press_releases/2007_11_28_en_pr_iffim_results.php 
and GAVI Alliance and The World Bank (2007). 
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vaccination projects. GAVI also seeks to optimizes product purchases, 
implementation, governance, monitoring and performance review of projects.  
To understand the importance of the type of work that is being carried out, and the 
impact of potentially being excluded from this funding, it is worth noting the uses of 
IFFIm funds allocated by GAVI during 2007. 
Figure 3: Uses of IFFIm funds through GAVI at Year-End 2007 (in USD millions)28 
Amount Purpose Note
181.0 Pentavalent 5-in-1 Vaccine 
Fights diptheria, pertussis, tetanus, hepatitis B and Hib (meningitis & pneumonia); 
country applications almost doubled in a year to 44
71.0 Health System Strengthening Build long-term national health (training, cold chain, logistics, etc.)
178.0 Country-Requested Programmes New vaccines & immunisation safety
139.0 Measles 
Equals 80% of total external measles funding for high-burden countries in 2007; life-
saving measles immunisation for 194 million children in 32 countries
191.3 Polio 
Fast-tracked into existing programs; june 2007, helped immunise over 100 million 
children, averting major set-back to 20-yr. effort to eradicate polio
32.0 Tactical (yellow fever vaccine stockpiles) Demand has almost doubled from 12 million doses in 2005 to 23 million in 2007
44.0 Maternal & Neonatal Tetanus (MNT) Equals 90% of funding resources for 2007 MNT global elimination campaign
836.3  
In essence, the IFFIm is the result of an effort by GAVI to secure sustainable and 
innovative financing sources for its work29. This allows GAVI to better plan its 
programs and optimize its operations with maximal current impact secured by long-
term funding. Although the IFFIm is registered as a separate entity, all of the funds 
raised through the Programme are directed to fund GAVI projects.  
This transaction won the Financial Times & IFC Sustainable Banking Deal of the Year 
Award in 2007, and characterized the IFFIm as follows: 
[A] new multilateral development body that for the first time enables capital markets 
to provide grants, not loans, to recipient countries … Qualifying programmes are 
approved for grants by an independent board with stringent approval and monitoring 
processes provided by the GAVI Alliance. Investors demonstrated strong support for 
its innovative structure and development mission. WHO estimates that through 
IFFIm, 500 million children will be vaccinated and 10 million lives saved, making an 
                                                
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Sustainable sources of financing in addition to the IFFIm include Advanced Market Commitments (AMC), 
which uses private donations to secure new vaccine product purchases at stable prices over time, and direct 
donations to GAVI from both individual governments and private philanthropy (individuals & institutions). 
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unprecedented contribution to achieving the Millennium Development Goal of 
reducing child mortality by two-thirds by 2015.30 
The Offering Memorandum of the Programme, as well as much of the IFFIm and 
GAVI documentation and information material, also make direct references to the 
importance of the IFFIm in helping to finance and to support the Millennium 
Development Goals (“MDGs”), particularly MDG 4 (“reduce child mortality”), and 
MDG 5 (“improve maternal health”), though also MDG 6 (“combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases”)31. Indeed, the commitment of the Donor Countries to the 
achievement of the MDGs is often cited by the relevant credit rating agencies in their 
reports as an important element to consider in the creditworthiness of the IFFIm. 
Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) rated IFFIm AAA/Stable/A-1+, its highest rating for 
creditworthiness and Fitch Ratings (“Fitch”) rated IFFIm AAA/F1+/Stable, also its 
highest rating for creditworthiness32.  
Another critical factor highlighted by the credit rating agencies in their reports and by 
the IFFIm itself in its transaction materials is the importance of the role of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the “World Bank”) as 
Treasury Manager. The World Bank’s stature and rating underpins the credibility and 
creditworthiness of this innovative financial instrument and is “a key component of 
IFFIm’s AAA/aaa/AAA ratings.” The participation of the World Bank, its “60 years of 
capital market experience,” and its “established conservative financial management 
policies”33 are often referred to in materials relating to the Programme and these are 
clearly an important element of the structuring of the Facility. 
                                                
30
 Financial Times Sustainable Banking Awards (2007). Linklaters, legal advisors to GAVI, have also have been 
named Banking and Finance team of the year by Legal Business, and Finance team of the year, debt and 
structured finance by The Lawyer Awards for their work on the GAVI fund. 
http://www.linklaters.com/practiceareas/specialismdetail.asp?specialismid=133&PracticeAreaID=5  
31
 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/; http://www.iff-immunisation.org/01_about_iffim.html; 
http://www.gavialliance.org/vision/index.php 
32
 Fitch Ratings (2006); Standard & Poor’s (2006); Moody’s Investors Service (2006) 
33
 All quotes in this paragraph taken from GAVI Alliance and The World Bank presentation in Oslo (2007). 
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2.3 IFFIm Conditionality – Rationale and Effects 
Much less visible in the marketing and information materials is the International 
Monetary Fund (“IMF”). Although the IMF does not have a formal role within the 
structure, the key conditionality provisions that govern the IFFIm are linked directly 
to the IMF: to IMF membership and to IMF Protracted Arrears. Protracted Arrears are 
defined as the failure by a country “to meet any IMF Financial Obligation where such 
failure has continued for a period of six calendar months or more from the date upon 
which the relevant amount which is the subject of such IMF Financial Obligation was 
originally due and payable.”34 While this conditionality is not referenced in any press 
release, it is clearly stated in the IFFIm’s Offering Memorandum, a public document: 
There are 72 countries currently eligible for support through GAVI programmes. 
IFFIm resources can be used in … GAVI eligible counries that are also members of, and 
not in Protracted Arrears (as defined herein) to, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). There are two GAVI eligible countries that are not members of the IMF (Cuba 
and North Korea35) and which will therefore not benefit from IFFIm funds. There are 
four GAVI eligible countries currently in protracted Arrears (Liberia, Somalia, Sudan 
and Zimbabwe).36 
Subsequent sections of the IFFIm Offering Memorandum discuss the Payment 
Conditionality clause linked to a Reference Portfolio of GAVI eligible countries that 
developed for the IFFIm structure37. Essentially, according to the Payment 
Conditionality clause, should any eligible country enter into “Protracted Arrears in 
meeting any of its IMF Financial Obligations38,” payments due by the Donor 
Countries to the IFFIm will be reduced by a percentage weighting allocated to that 
country (62 countries are allocated a 1% weighting, Viet Nam is allocated a 3% 
                                                
34
 Offering Memorandum at p.94. 
35
 Despite the fact that a Cuba delegation was present at the Bretton Woods meetings that created the IMF and the 
World Bank, Cuba withdrew from the fund in 1964; Pujol (1991) Both Cuba and North Korea manage their 
economies centrally. Trade between the US and Cuba and North Korea is restricted given TWEA (1917). 
36
 Offering Memorandum at p.7 
37
 Ibid. at p.13. This reference portfolio was developed together with GAVI, reflecting GAVI’s estimates 
regarding its level of engagement in a particular country over the course of the pledge periods. Source: personal 
communications. 
38
 Ibid. at p.93, defined as “any obligation of a Specified Country to make a payment of principal or interest due 
and payable to the IMF pursuant to any loan agreement or similar arrangement entered into by that Specified 
Country with the IMF” 
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weighting, while 7 countries are allocated a 5% weighting39). For example, if 25 or 
more days prior to a payment date Ethiopia were to enter into Protracted Arrears with 
the IMF, Donor Countries’ payments to the IFFIm would decrease an additional 5% 
from pledged amounts. Ethiopia would not be eligible to receive funding from the 
IFFIm until its Protracted Arrears with the IMF were cleared. Once Ethiopia managed 
to clear its IMF Protracted Arrears, payments for all the grantors would go up by 5% 
again and Ethiopia would again become eligible for program funding using IFFIm 
funds. Because Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe each have a 1% weighting, 
Donor Countries have been required to make 96% of their committed payments to the 
IFFIm. Now that Liberia has come out of IMF Protracted Arrears, 97% of pledged 
amounts will become due.40 
The effects of this conditionality are discussed in more detail in the section below, but 
essentially, there are three: 1) entire countries are excluded from participating in 
IFFIm-funded immunization programs; 2) the IFFIm funds available for distribution 
are decreased for all GAVI eligible countries should any one of them fall into arrears 
with the IMF41; and 3) in order to give the IFFIm the highest credit rating (AAA), 
rating agencies respond to the uncertainty created by this structure by requiring that 
approximately 30% (or US$1.5 billion) of total pledges be held back as security for 
bondholders rather than used for immunization programs (Gearing Ratio Limit)42.  
As early as 18 months prior to the issuance of the IFFIm Notes in November 2006, the 
consequences of this conditionality were clear: 
There are four countries in protracted arrears at present (Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe), and from 1990 onwards 7 countries entered protracted arrears. These 
                                                
39
 This weighting is intended to reflect “the expected larger value of programmes funded by IFFIm in those 
countries.” The 7 countries allocated a 5% weighting are Bangladesh, Congo DR, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan. These estimates were based on GAVI’s input. 
40
 Fitch Ratings (2008) p.4. 
41
 Ibid. at p.13 describes the Payment Conditionality clause and the Reference Portfolio of countries that have 
been established under the IFFIm. 
42
 Offering Memorandum pp.13, 15, 17, 24, 27, 49, 92,93; CMFB Consultation (July 2005) p.2, footnote 2; 
Standard & Poor’s (2006) pp.2, 6; Fitch Ratings (2006) p.4. 
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four countries will not be eligible for IFFIm-backed programmes whilst in protracted 
arrears. … If a country enters into such ‘protracted arrears’, donors will reduce their 
payments to IFFIm by an amount equal to the percentage of the expenditure for that 
country in the total programme expenditure... By borrowing against only a fixed 
percentage of pledged amounts, IFFIm creates a cushion.. if this percentage is set at 
70%, the bonds will get a AAA debt rating…43 
2.3.1 Rationale for Conditionality 
Nowhere in GAVI’s promotional materials or in the official IFFIm documentation is 
the reason behind the inclusion of IMF-related conditionality explained in any detail44. 
While the rating agencies are clear in their reports that the Gearing Ratio is required to 
mitigate the risk created by the IMF Protracted Arrears clause45, nothing points to the 
rationale for the IMF Protracted Arrears clause in the first place. 
A presentation during an Innovative Finance conference held in Oslo three months 
after the launch of the Notes notes the following:  
o It is important to the donors that their grant payments fund immunisation 
programmes in well-governed states over the next 20 years. 
o Donors pay 100% of their legally binding grants, unless a recipient country 
breaches a ‘high level performance test’. 
o The high level performance test for recipient countries chosen for IFFIm is 
‘protracted arrears to the IMF’. 
o IFFIm may not fund programmes in countries that have breached the test and 
donors will be relieved of a fixed percentage of their payments for each recipient 
country in arrears (see prospectus).46 (emphasis added) 
These points indicate that the conditionality was the result of Donor Countries’ 
concern over recipient country governance. The question as to why children living in 
states that are not well-governed do not require immunization aid is not addressed, 
                                                
43
 CMFB Consultation (July 2005) pp.2-3. 
44
 Carmichael in her 2007 Newsweek article mentions “tricky rules of budgeting” but no further explanation. No 
information is available from GAVI or in the Offering Memorandum (2006). 
45
 Standard & Poor’s (2006) pp.2, 6; Fitch Ratings (2006) p.4 
46
 GAVI Alliance and The World Bank (2007) p.16. 
 23 
nor is the question of whether there are poorly-governed states not in protracted 
arrears to the IMF.  
Neither the offering documentation nor the marketing materials explain the genesis of 
the IMF conditionality. The reader is left to wonder why Ethiopia’s entering into IMF 
Protracted Arrears should impact the United Kingdom’s or any of the Donor 
Countries’ ability to abide by their “valid and binding obligations”47. Why is the 
payment risk of developed nations, through intentional structuring, being impacted 
by the weighted macroeconomic stability of 70 of the world’s least developed 
countries? If Ethiopia did enter into Protracted Arrears with the IMF, wouldn’t 
Ethiopian children still need immunization? Wouldn’t they especially need aid in 
such a difficult macroeconomic time for the country? 
Only through discussions with individuals involved in IFFIm structuring did the 
rationale behind the IMF conditionality become clear. According to these individuals, 
and borne out by materials relating only to the preparatory work of the IFFIm 
structure, the existence of the IMF-related conditionality is the result of discussions 
with Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Communities. Eurostat is not 
focused on aid or development: its role is to “gather and analyse figures from the 
different European statistics offices in order to provide comparable and harmonised 
data to the European Institutions so they can define, implement and analyse 
Community policies.”48  
At issue was the accounting impact of the multi-year Donor Country pledges. If 
pledged amounts were unconditional, then Eurostat would ask that they be accounted 
by each Donor Country as national debt. Donor Countries’ entire pledged amounts 
for the next 20 years would be reflected as debt the moment the IFFIm issued its first 
Notes. To avoid this classification, which is very unattractive to Donor Countries, an 
                                                
47
 Offering Memorandum p.27 as part of an explanation regarding Risk Factors related to the Notes that “the 
financial servicing and performance of the terms of the Notes depend primarily upon performance by each 
Grantor of its obligations under the Grant Agreement to which it is a party, and its covenant to make payments 
thereunder.”  
48
 Mission statement from Eurostat’s homepage. Accessed March 2008. 
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element of conditionality or uncertainty would have to be introduced. The IMF 
Protracted Arrears and Payments resolved this accounting issue. 
It is important to realize that the debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) metric is a 
critical concern to governments, since too high a percentage of debt-to-GDP can 
impact the perceived financial health of a country and have other broader monetary 
policy and EU-related implications. Countries that are part of the European Union 
(EU) are under the scrutiny of the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank, which monitor that member countries are complying with the “institutional 
arrangements for sound fiscal policies that have been agreed at the EU level, also with 
a view to limit risks to price stability.” This focuses primarily on Articles 99 and 104 of 
the European Treaty as well as the Stability and Growth Pact, which establishes a limit 
of debt-to-GDP. This limit, set at 60% debt-to-GDP, is considered to be the “basic rule 
of budgetary policy” in the EU49. 
At the time that these critical structuring decisions regarding the IFFIm were being 
made (early 2005), the Council of the European Union had just released its Presidency 
Conclusions document50. Item 1 of this document was to endorse the EU’s Economic 
and Financial Affair Council’s (ECOFIN) proposals for improving the implementation 
of the Stability and Growth Pact, which “reaffirms the need to reduce government 
debt to below 60% of GDP … The higher the debt to GDP ratios of Member States, the 
greater must be their efforts to reduce them rapidly.”51 
At the time, while the UK was comfortably below the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio, it is 
interesting to note that the second largest Donor Country to the IFFIm, France, had a 
debt-to-GDP ratio of 66.4%. Italy’s ratio was 105.8%, the highest within Europe52. The 
                                                
49
 European Central Bank http://www.ecb.int/mopo/eaec/fiscal/html/index.en.html; European Treaty Arts.99, 104.  
50
 Council of the European Union (2005) 
51
 Ibid. at p.35. 
52
 Based on Eurostat data, the debt-to-GDP rates of the Donor Countries in 2005 –the time of the IFFIm 
structuring – were as follows: UK (42.1%); Spain (43.0%); Sweden (50.9%); Norway (43.8%). Public debt is 
defined in the Maastricht Treaty as consolidated general government gross debt at nominal value, outstanding at 
the end of the year. The general government sector comprises central government, state government, local 
government, and social security funds. The relevant definitions are provided in Council Regulation 3605/93, as 
amended. Data for the general government sector are consolidated between sub-sectors at the national level. The 
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decision by Eurostat to allow the IFFIm pledges to be classified as something other 
than government debt “opens the door for interested EU donors to make off-budget 
pledges of future ODA streams to the IFFIm”53. For France and Italy, the next two 
largest donors after the UK, this must have been a compelling argument when 
pledging the EUR1.7 billion that would eventually nearly double the size of the IFFIm.  
Clearly, achieving “off-budget” classification has significant and positive implications. 
The critical issue is whether the measure that was chosen to create the conditionality 
required by Eurostat was the only available option. Is 4% conditionality really 
conditionality? Is it worth excluding 100 million people from large pools of capital 
earmarked for the immunization of children? 
In order to reach its determination, Eurostat required an unambiguous and 
transparent “conditionality trigger”. A delicate balance needed to be reached between 
being able to securitize (i.e. sell to the market) multi-year pledges portrayed as 
“legally binding”, and creating conditionality that would keep them “off budget”. On 
the one hand, the pledges were good as gold; on the other hand, maybe they would 
get paid, but maybe they wouldn’t. Admittedly, this is a tough balance to strike.  
By choosing IMF Protracted Arrears as a high-level test, and assigning percentages to 
the eligible countries, the risk that some portion of the pledged amounts would not be 
honored by Donor Countries was introduced. Bondholders would have to consider 
not only the ability of Donor Countries to pay, but the risk that eligible countries 
would enter into protracted arrears with the IMF. In essence, the payment risk of 
some of the world’s highest rated countries was now conditioned by at least a 
measure of the risk of some of the world’s poorest nations. Clearly, if the risk had 
been transferred too much in the direction of the poor countries, bondholders would 
                                                                                                                                                      
series are measured in euro and presented as a percentage of GDP. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=0&language=en&pcode=eb070  
53
 The World Bank and The International Monetary Fund (2005) at p.5. Interestingly, already at this early date, 
this report mentions commitments from France, Italy, Spain and Sweden totaling over US$5 billion. According to 
GAVI, France’s initial commitment in 2006 was EUR372.8 million and only in 2007 did France pledge an 
additional, much larger commitment of EUR867.2 million which would bring total pledges to that figure. 
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be reticent to purchase bonds for fear of not being repaid. What was required was a 
risk transfer that was potential, but not likely. A risk transfer mechanism that 
everyone would be relatively comfortable would never really be fully triggered, but 
with enough reasonable doubt to pacify the accounting authorities. 54  
Amazingly, the almost cosmetic nature of this conditionality is recognized by the very 
agency requiring it, and the Eurostat task force report states: 
…using historical events as an indicator of the future, the risk of any recipient country 
entering into protracted arrears with the IMF can be judged as limited and bondholders 
can be reasonably secure. Therefore, the conditionality clause might seem as artificial, as 
pledges from government in this case could be judged as being almost certain to be 
honoured (due to the contractual obligations)55 (emphasis added) 
In discussions with several professionals involved, the case has been strongly and 
convincingly argued that without this clause, the IFFIm structure and billions of 
pledged aid would never have been possible. Clearly, this is true, and the intention of 
all involved was to resolve a major obstacle to the structuring of this highly 
innovative and beneficial structure. Nevertheless, the discriminatory effects of this 
condition are also a part of the IFFIm reality and are equally undeniable.  
It is difficult to justify purposely denying access to aid to some children, or even to 
one, for the benefit of giving access to aid to many others. Not having to do it face to 
face probably helps. Particularly when the gating issue is accounting regulation and 
when the funds in question are public, not private, the consequences of potentially 
“artificial” structuring require scrutiny. The fact that other sources of aid may 
potentially be available to those excluded from IFFIm funding does not mitigate the 
argument. The funds in question are government funds, not private donations, and as 
such, their distribution should be held to higher standards of non-discrimination. 
Would it be legal to deny access to government services to the very poor within the 
UK, France or Spain, on the theory that “others” would tend to their needs? Do 
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 Confirmed through several personal communications in 2008; Fitch Ratings (2006), Fitch Ratings (2008), 
Standard & Poor’s (2006). 
55
 CMFB (20 July 2005) 
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nations have the obligation to behave similarly on the international stage as they do 
domestically? Are nations responsible for the extraterritorial effects of their actions? 
Before reviewing responsibilities and obligations, the specific effects of IMF 
conditionality within the IFFIm should be detailed.  
2.3.2 Three Effects of IMF Conditionality 
IMF conditionality within the IFFIm (Membership, Protracted Arrears, and Payment 
Conditionality) has several effects: 1) the Membership and Protracted Arrears clauses 
prohibit the funding of immunization programmes with IFFIm funds to some of the 
world’s poorest nations56; 2) Payment Conditionality potentially reduces the total 
amount of IFFIm funds available to fund immunization programs; and 3) the 
uncertainty created by the conditionality (however ‘artificial’) results in rating 
agencies requiring additional security for bondholders through the Gearing Ratio. 
Firstly, the preemptive exclusion of Cuba, North Korea, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe (together, the “IFFIm Excluded States” and as a subset, Liberia, Somalia, 
Sudan and Zimbabwe, together, the “IFFIm Sub-Saharan Excluded States”) is 
mentioned twice in the bond documentation, but is not discussed at all in GAVI’s 
promotional materials. While perhaps Cuba, a High Human Development country 
ranked No. 51 in the UNDP’s 2007/2008 Human Development Report, is not currently 
in need of immunization aid, the same is unlikely to be true for North Korea57. 
Irrespective of current need, utilizing the IFFIm precedent for future MDG or 
development funding, as is clearly intended, would perpetuate these exclusions. 
By way of context, the IFFIm Sub-Saharan Excluded States have been in an arrears 
situation that predates the information available on the IMF website58. In the case of 
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 Subsequent sections of this thesis will explore whether the exclusion of the entire population of certain 
countries given their governments’ inability or unwillingness to repay IMF arrears could potentially amount to 
discrimination based on government viability. 
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 Human Development Report (2007) p.233; North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), Liberia 
and Somalia not ranked given unavailability of reliable data. North Korea’s % Population Undernourished (33%) 
indicates severity of that nation’s situation. 
58
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extdbt1.aspx. 
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Zimbabwe, the country has been in arrears for ‘only’ 6.5 years, whereas the other 
nations have been in an arrears situation for at least 20 years. In February 2008, the 
World Bank and the IMF ‘deemed’ that Liberia59 was eligible for debt relief under the 
enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative60. Such announcements 
signal the commencement of a process (eligibility-decision point-completion point), 
eligibility only “paves the way for the consideration of the HIPC decision point in the 
near future and multilateral debt relief going forward.”  
To date, 32 countries have reached a ‘decision point’, of which 23 have reached the 
‘completion point’. As of December 2007, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan had reached the 
level “Pre-Decision Point Countries”61 (Zimbabwe has not). While Liberia managed to 
regulate its relationship to the IMF in March 2008, it did so too late to benefit from the 
over US$800 million in IFFIm funds that were disbursed by GAVI during 200762.  
While a GAVI eligible country that resolves its arrears situation with the IMF will 
again become eligible to have IFFIm proceeds fund its approved GAVI programs63, 
the probability of such resolutions taking place in the short to medium term is 
uncertain at best and improbable at worst (Liberia is now the exception that may 
prove this rule). Historically, countries spend an average of 7 years in default to the 
IMF64, which is also not ideal, considering that the intention is to issue Notes and 
disburse funds through 2015. The question remains whether any arrears situations can 
be resolved before 20 years’s worth of immunization aid is “frontloaded” and 
disbursed to other countries. The severity of this situation would only be 
compounded, and the exclusion of certain nations from the benefits of international 
development aid would be even more dramatic, if either the IFF large-scale program 
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 At February 2008, Liberia had approx. US$1.5 billion in arrears to the IMF (US$824 million), the World Bank 
(US$474 million) and the African Development Bank (US$196 million), representing approx. 10x Liberian 
government revenues. Several donor nations and institutions, including the UK and the US worked to secure 
financing that would enable Liberia to become current on these accounts. Much of this aid comes in the way of 
debt relief and other non-sustainable types of aid. DFID (February 2008) 
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 IMF (February 2008) 
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 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm for details. 
62
 GAVI Alliance (November 2007) p.1. 
63
 Confirmed through personal communication (October 2007). 
64
 Fitch Ratings (2006) p.8. Median number of years spent in IMF arrears is 4; Fitch uses 6 for its risk analysis. 
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is launched or if the IFFIm structure is employed for other development projects (such 
as the aforementioned clean-water bonds). 
Figure 4: Countries in IMF Arrears as of December 31, 2007  
(in SDRs whereby 1SDR = 1.580248 USD)
Member Total
General Dept. (incl. 
SAF) SDR Dept. /1/
PRGF-ESF 
Trust/Trust Fund
Liberia 540,245,257 479,857,435 29,682,492 30,705,330
Somalia 238,300,218 217,019,714 13,213,505 8,066,999
Sudan 1,025,950,385 945,902,604 0 80,047,781
Zimbabwe 88,023,439 0 0 88,023,439
    Total 1,892,519,299 1,642,779,753 42,895,997 206,843,549
Member Total < 1 year 1-2 years 2-3 years 3+ years
 Arrears 
Since
Liberia 540,245,257 12,970,698 11,527,467 8,362,469 507,384,623 ~ 1986
Somalia 238,300,218 6,386,744 5,660,633 4,105,233 222,147,608 ~ 1986
Sudan 1,025,950,385 14,707,366 14,680,250 11,484,579 985,078,190 ~ 1986
Zimbabwe 88,023,439 3,435,748 2,843,420 5,419,421 76,324,850 Aug-2001
    Total 1,892,519,299 37,500,556 34,711,770 29,371,702 1,790,935,271
/1/ Includes assessments levied for purpose of reimbursing the General Department under Article XVI, Section 2
/2/ Source IMF and Fitch Ratings report 04 September 2006 at p.8
By Type
By Duration
 
Secondly, the Payment Conditionality condition has the additional negative 
repercussion that in the time of one country’s economic emergency or government 
truancy (leading to a protracted arrears situation for that government), not only 
would children living in that nation no longer be eligible for IFFIm funded 
vaccination programs, but the funds available to all of the other eligible countries 
would also be reduced. In traditional financing instruments, where investments made 
in a specific country or region are expected to yield a certain return, and if they cease 
to do so, additional investments in that country may be curtailed, such clauses 
mitigate certain risks. However, in the case of the IFFIm, where “return” is measured 
in number of lives saved, exposure-weighted and pro-rata reductions of commitments 
seem anathema to the purpose of the IFFIm itself. 
Thirdly, the rating agencies become very focused on the transfer of risk to 
bondholders that is created through the IMF conditionality. Fitch notes both the 
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“political risk” and the fact that “the size of the commitments from donor countries is 
conditional on the recipient countries honouring their financial obligations to the 
IMF”65 and devotes significant portions of its analysis to determining the likelihood 
and impact of these risks. S&P focuses only on the risk that has been created within 
the structure through the addition of the IMF Protracted Arrears clause. In essence, if 
all countries eligible for funding go into IMF protracted arrears, Donor Countries 
would not have to make any payments under their grant agreements and purchasers 
of the Notes would not be repaid. This risk then requires a mitigant, which in the case 
of the IFFIm structure is the Gearing Ratio Limit. In order to provide a safety margin 
for bondholders, approximately 30% of the funds received from Donor Countries 
which could be used for immunization programs are set aside for the comfort of 
bondholders66.  
Arguably, through the IFFIm structure, not only is structural risk created that could 
potentially work at cross-purposes with the intended goals of GAVI and the IFFIm, 
but the mitigant to that created risk also substantially reduces the amount of funds 
available for immunization programs. In practical terms, 30% of the first Notes 
issuance totals US$300 million, or more than twice what was allocated during 2007 by 
GAVI for funding the measles vaccines that immunized 194 million children in 32 
countries. The question is whether there is a better use for that US$300 million than 
serving as a buffer to compensate for the ‘artificial’ uncertainty created by the IMF 
conditionality itself. 
In the section that follows, the underlying intent of the parties involved in the IFFIm 
will be reviewed. The human rights related implications of this intent, given Donor 
Country obligations, will be examined subsequently.  
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 Fitch Ratings (2006) p.7: “… a donor country might conceivably re-consider its commitments if one or more of 
the recipient countries became a ‘rogue’ state unworthy of ongoing support.” 
66
 Standard & Poor’s (2006) p.9. 
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3. Content: Perspectives on Motivation, Intent & Expectations 
When considering the topic of aid in general, much has been written and debated 
about the underlying concerns and motivations of donors as well as the expectations 
and obligations of recipients. While a significant portion of aid is arguably given only 
to further the strategic, political, religious, economic, and commercial interests of 
donors, a certain percentage of aid is given as a result of humanitarian, ethical or 
moral imperatives67. In the case of the IFFIm, and based on the press releases and 
public statements made by representatives of each of the participants relating to the 
mechanism, it seems clear that the underlying intent in both the structuring and 
execution of this structure can be placed in the latter category. 
Nevertheless, conversations with individuals involved in the structuring and 
execution of the IFFIm confirm that discussions regarding this conditionality were 
held “at the highest government levels” and that “in the case of Liberia, Somalia, 
Sudan and Zimbabwe, there is no practical chance of them benefitting [sp.] at the 
moment - they were in arrears at the start of the programme, and everyone was aware 
of that.”68 Understanding the juxtaposition of this knowledge with the stated intent of 
the parties involved is the purpose of this section. 
3.1 Underlying Intent of Donor Countries 
This section will focus principally on the United Kingdom given its pivotal role. 
Already in early 2003, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown presented a 
proposal for a broader, larger International Finance Facility (IFF) at the G-7 Meetings 
in Paris (February 2003) and Washington, D.C. (IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings, 
April 2003)69. This joint initiative of the UK’s Treasury Department and its Department 
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 Riddell (1996). 
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 From verbal and written personal communications held 15 May 2008 and 24 October 2007, respectively. 
69
 Mavrotas (2003). 
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for International Development (DFID)70 was specifically intended to “exploit 
techniques for securitization in the capital markets as an innovative source for 
generating funds necessary for the achievement of MDGs”71. It should also be noted 
that already in 2003, the government of France was on the record as fully supporting 
the initiative, while other donors were considering the feasibility of the structure 
primarily on the basis of whether such long term legally binding commitments were 
possible under their respective constitutions (an issue that has inhibited German and 
possibly also U.S. participation in the IFFIm), and whether such frontloaded aid 
amounts could be effectively absorbed.72 
3.1.1 Intent Regarding Development-Related Aid Generally 
In determining the UK’s underlying intent in relation to the IFFIm, as well as to aid 
policies in general, the following statements are telling: 
On the IFFIm at the time of its launch (underlining added)73: 
"Today's launch of the International Finance Facility for Immunisation - IFFIm - will 
help poor children in the developing world get the vaccines that children in the 
developed world take for granted." Hilary Benn (Secretary of State for DFID). 
"Today, by matching the capacity of medical advance with the power of long-term 
finance we are launching an initiative capable of saving ten million lives - sparing 
millions of families across the world from the avoidable pain of a son or a daughter 
needlessly dying." Gordon Brown (UK Chancellor of the Exchequer). 
On development aid, the UK aid budget, debt relief and innovative financing, 
respectively (underlining added):74 
The Government aims to promote UK economic prospects by pursuing increased 
productivity and efficiency in the EU, international financial stability and increased 
global prosperity, including especially protecting the most vulnerable. 
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 The DFID “is the part of the UK Government that manages Britain’s aid to poor countries and works to get rid 
of extreme poverty”. See http://www.dfid.gov.uk. 
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 Mavrotas (2003) p.1. 
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 United Nations – Financing for Development (2003).  
73
 IFFIm Press Release (September 2005) 
74
 UK Treasury’s website. Accessed intermittently February-May 2008. 
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Tackling global poverty remains a key priority for the UK Government, as 
demonstrated at the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR07), which 
announced significant increases to the Department of International Development’s 
(DFID) budget. 
The Government supports the full financing and swift implementation of both the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI). Together, HIPC and MDRI are expected over time to deliver over 
US $100 billion of debt relief to the World's poorest countries. 
The Government's aim is to ensure that no country committed to poverty reduction 
and good governance should be denied the opportunity of pursuing this goal through 
lack of resources. Innovative financing mechanisms are needed to help deliver and 
bring forward the financing urgently needed to achieve the MDGs. 
We believe that debt relief should be provided on the basis of a country’s economic 
situation rather than on their history of poor or corrupt governance. Many countries 
that have a history of poor governance are now middle-income countries … 
Unpayable debts should not hinder the poorest countries from making progress 
towards the Millennium Development Goals.75 
When answering the question “Why is the UK Government involved in 
development?” (underlining added): 
In a world of growing wealth, such levels of human suffering and wasted potential are 
not only morally wrong, they are also against our own interests. We are becoming 
much closer to people in faraway countries. We trade more and more with people 
around the world. Many of the problems which affect us, such as war and conflict, 
international crime, refugees, the trade in illegal drugs and the spread of diseases like 
HIV and AIDS, are caused or made worse by poverty in developing countries. Getting 
rid of poverty will make for a better world for everybody.76 
From these statements, it appears that the UK links its development assistance to a 
moral imperative, the global impetus behind the Millenium Development Goals, and 
its own interests, including national security and immigration, as well as its 
international standing as a generous, aid-giving nation. While the UK (and other 
European nations) may arguably also have a historical imperative obligation to fulfill 
vis-à-vis its former colonies and territories, this topic is not addressed. The 
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 Alexander (January 2008). 
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 DFID website. Accessed intermittently February-May 2008. 
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preponderance of statements are targeted broadly on highly sympathetic topics: 
poverty reduction, saving the lives of children, improving living conditions for other 
human beings in the most disadvantaged nations, and similar.  
A review of intents expressed by other Donor Countries reveals broadly the same 
intent, and nowhere is a differentiation drawn between children who reside in nations 
which have regularized relationships with the IMF and those who do not. 
3.1.2 Intent Regarding Aid to IFFIm Excluded States77 
In terms of actual flows of overseas development aid (ODA) from IFFIm Donor 
Countries, it should be noted that: 1) several of the Donor Countries are and have 
been aid providers to the IFFIm Excluded States outside the IFFIm structure; and 2) 
several of the Donor Countries are aid providers to GAVI directly, outside the IFFIm 
structure. These two facts, reviewed in detail below, contradict the assumption that 
IFFIm Donor Countries would refuse to fund aid programs in countries with poor 
governance. Not only have they done so bi- and multi-laterally, but they have done so 
through GAVI, which has funded programs in most of the IFFIm Excluded States. 
Importantly, project execution and monitoring is the same for all GAVI programs, 
irrespective of funding source78. 
With the exception of France and Spain, each of the IFFIm Donor Countries has been 
an aid provider to at least one IFFIm Sub-Saharan Excluded State. Taking the United 
Kingdom specifically, and given its level of activity particularly in the IFFIm Sub-
Saharan Excluded States, one can hardly conclude that the DFID or the British 
government are reticent to give aid to these countries or that UK ODA is typically 
dependent on a “high level test” linked to IMF dues. While it is clear that the UK (and 
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78
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probably other IFFIm Donor Country governments) are reticent to provide aid 
directly to the governments of certain nations for fear of mismanagement of funds or 
corruption, it is equally clear that aid channelled through non-governmental, UN 
agencies or other channels is common. This multi-pronged approach to aid (i.e., not 
directly through government channels) is fundamentally similar to the method that 
GAVI uses in carrying out its own projects (see section titled GAVI Oversight & 
Governance, as well as Annex I for more information). 
Figure 5: Major Recipients of Individual DAC Members’ Aid79 
Gross disbursements as a % of total ODA (highlighting added)
Ethiopia  6.7 Mozambique  5.0 Iraq  15.5 Tanzania  8.5 Tanzania  4.2 Sudan  3.6
Somalia  6.2 Ethiopia  4.4 Nigeria  13.9 Bangladesh  4.8 Mozambique  4.1 Palestinian Adm. Areas  2.8
Sudan  4.5 Bosnia-Herzegovina  2.5 Ethiopia  2.1 Mozambique  3.9 Palestinian Adm. Areas  3.5 Tanzania  2.4
Mozambique  2.4 Morocco  2.3 Serbia  1.6 Kenya  3.8 Bangladesh  3.2 Mozambique  2.3
Pakistan  2.0 Malta  1.7 China  1.1 India  3.5 Bosnia-Herzegovina  3.1 Afghanistan  2.3
Tanzania  1.8 Jordan  1.6 Congo, Rep.  1.1 Zambia  3.3 Zambia  2.6 Zambia  2.0
Tunisia  1.8 Argentina  1.4 Nicaragua  0.9 Pakistan  1.8 Angola  2.1 Sri Lanka  1.8
Chad  1.4 Congo, Rep.  1.1 Tunisia  0.8 Zimbabwe  1.8 Nicaragua  2.0 Pakistan  1.8
Turkey  1.4 Egypt  1.1 Cameroon  0.7 Botswana  1.7 Sri Lanka  1.8 Malawi  1.7
Angola  1.4 Algeria  1.0 Afghanistan  0.6 Sri Lanka  1.6 Ethiopia  1.8 Uganda  1.7
Senegal  1.3 Eritrea  1.0 Morocco  0.6 Ethiopia  1.6 States Ex-Yugoslavia  1.6 Ethiopia  1.4
China  1.3 Guinea-Bissau  1.0 Argentina  0.6 Sudan  1.2 Uganda  1.6 Serbia  1.2
India  1.3 Albania  0.9 Zambia  0.6 Nicaragua  1.2 Rwanda  1.6 Somalia  1.1
Cape Verde  1.3 Brazil  0.8 Mozambique  0.6 Madagascar  0.6 Zimbabwe  1.5 Indonesia  1.0
Uganda  1.2 Tunisia  0.8 Madagascar  0.6 China  0.6 Indonesia  1.4 Bangladesh  0.9
Total above  35.8 Total above  26.7 Total above  41.4 Total above  39.9 Total above  36.0 Total above  27.9
1985-86 1995-96 2005-06
Norway
2005-061985-86
Italy
1995-96
 
Tanzania  8.0 Mozambique  3.1 Iraq  4.0 India  9.9 India  5.2 Nigeria  22.2
India  6.3 Tanzania  3.0 Tanzania  2.8 Bangladesh  3.1 Zambia  2.3 Iraq  6.3
Mozambique  5.3 India  2.8 Mozambique  2.3 Sudan  2.6 Bangladesh  2.3 India  4.2
Viet Nam  5.2 Nicaragua  2.2 Uganda  1.5 Kenya  2.5 Uganda  2.1 Afghanistan  1.9
Zambia  3.5 Viet Nam  2.2 Ethiopia  1.5 Malaysia  2.4 Malawi  2.1 Tanzania  1.8
Ethiopia  3.1 Ethiopia  2.1 Kenya  1.3 Zambia  2.0 Pakistan  1.8 Sudan  1.7
Sri Lanka  3.0 Bosnia-Herzegovina  1.8 Sudan  1.3 Indonesia  1.5 States Ex-Yugoslavia  1.6 Bangladesh  1.6
Zimbabwe  2.3 Zimbabwe  1.8 Afghanistan  1.2 Pakistan  1.5 Indonesia  1.6 Pakistan  1.3
Bangladesh  2.0 Zambia  1.7 Palestinian Adm. Areas  1.2 Ethiopia  1.4 China  1.6 Ghana  1.2
Kenya  1.8 Iraq  1.7 Bosnia-Herzegovina  1.2 Gibraltar  1.4 Tanzania  1.5 Malawi  1.1
Angola  1.7 Angola  1.7 Viet Nam  1.2 Egypt  1.4 Kenya  1.2 Serbia  1.1
Nicaragua  1.6 Uganda  1.6 Zambia  1.1 Ghana  1.2 Zimbabwe  1.1 Uganda  1.1
Botswana  1.2 Bangladesh  1.5 Nicaragua  1.1 Zimbabwe  1.2 Mozambique  1.1 Zambia  1.0
Guinea-Bissau  1.0 South Africa  1.4 Serbia  1.1 Tanzania  1.2 Ghana  0.9 Ethiopia  1.0
China  0.9 Palestinian Adm. Areas  1.2 Sri Lanka  1.0 Malawi  1.0 Ethiopia  0.9 Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.9
Total above  47.0 Total above  29.7 Total above  23.7 Total above  34.3 Total above  27.4 Total above  48.6
Sweden United Kingdom
1985-86 1995-96 2005-06 1985-86 1995-96 2005-06
 
 
There is an important discrepancy between tables listing the main recipients of 
bilateral aid from IFFIm Donor Countries, and tables listing the top ten donors to 
IFFIm Excluded States shown below. Although some recipient countries do not rank 
in the top fifteen aid recipients from the Donor Country perspective, every single 
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 OECD (DCD-DAC) 2007 Table 32. 
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Donor Country appears at least once as a top ten aid provider for the IFFIm Excluded 
States (no data on North Korea was available).  
For example, a DFID profile states “Historically, DFID has not been a major donor to 
Liberia”. From the tables below, it would be more exact to say that Liberia has not been 
a major destination for DFID aid, since, from the perspective of Liberia, the United 
Kingdom has been a major donor indeed.  
Figure 6: Top Ten Donors of Gross ODA (2004-2005 Average) 
USD millions (source: OECD, World Bank at www.oecd.org/dac)
1 United States 96 1 EC 46 1 United States 575 1 WFP 61 1 Spain 16
2 EC 42 2 United States 34 2 United Kingdom 157 2 United Kingdom 48 2 United States 10
3 Sweden 14 3 Norway 33 3 EC 141 3 EC 44 3 Canada 8
4 United Kingdom 12 4 Netherlands 17 4 Netherlands 126 4 United States 32 4 United Kingdom 8
5 Norway 9 5 Italy 14 5 Norway 78 5 Germany 15 5 Arab Agencies 6
6 Netherlands 8 6 Sweden 13 6 Germany 47 6 Sweden 14 6 Global Fund (GATF) 5
7 UNHCR 7 7 United Kingdom 11 7 Sweden 36 7 Netherlands 13 7 Switzerland 5
8 Global Fund (GFATM) 7 8 Global Fund (GFATM) 8 8 Arab Agencies 28 8 Canada 11 8 Japan 5
9 Germany 6 9 UNICEF 6 9 WFP 27 9 Norway 11 9 France 4
10 UNDP 5 10 UNDP 6 10 Canada 24 10 Denmark 6 10 EC 3
Cuba
Note: '06 UK aid est. GBP10m 
(approx. USD18m), up 54% from 
2004-05 figure above
Note: '07 UK aid est. GBP21m 
(approx. USD42m), up 282% from 
from 2004-05 figure above
Note: '07 UK aid est. GBP114m 
(approx. USD228m), up 45% from 
from 2004-05 figure above
Note: '07 UK aid est. GBP40m 
(approx. USD80m), up 67% from 
from 2004-05 figure above
Liberia Somalia Sudan Zimbabwe
 
 
What follows is a more detailed review of Great Britain’s recent aid activities in the 
IFFIm Sub-Saharan Excluded States (no country profiles on Cuba or North Korea 
were available from the DFID)80. 
On Liberia: From 2003 through 2006, DFID provided GBP22 million to Liberia, 
(GBP16 million in humanitarian assistance). DFID plays a supporting role, 
channelling aid mostly through multilateral arrangements. In a response to a 
communication sent by the Children Can’t Wait campaign on debt relief in 
Liberia, Hilary Benn (DFID Secretary of State) responded on behalf of himself 
and of Gordon Brown by stating “Liberia’s arrears to the main international 
financial institutions have to be cleared up before it can receive aid under the HIPC 
(debt relief initiative), but Liberia will not be expected to clear the arrears itself”. 
Further, Mr. Benn states that the UK has an increased commitment to Liberia, 
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 See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/allcountries.asp for a review of the countries which as of the writing of 
this paper receive funding from DFID – either directly or through multilateral agencies. All information referred 
to below is sourced from the Country Factsheets available on the DFID website. 
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and “are giving priority to the health sector.”81 In February 2008, the UK 
contributed GBP20 million towards the clearing of Liberia’s long term arrears. 
On Somalia: DFID notes significantly increased aid (from GBP3.1 million in 
2002/2003 to GBP21 million in 2007/2008 budget) and that it is working closely 
with other donors and UN agencies. 
On Sudan: DFID has Khartoum office as of July 2006, which takes the lead in 
development and humanitarian work and works together with the British 
Embassy in Sudan. In addition, a Joint Donor Team (involving the UK, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Canada) was established in May 
2006. “None of the substantial development and humanitarian assistance that HMG 
[Her Majesty’s Government] provided to Sudan over the last 12 months went directly 
to the government of Sudan”82. 
On Zimbabwe: DFID does not provide direct funding to the government of 
Zimbabwe, but channels aid through UN agencies and Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs). Focus in the region is support of the poorest and most 
vulnerable, with priority on HIV/AIDS and reducing food insecurity. In 
February 2008, the UK government announced it was providing GBP5 million 
in emergency support for medicines and medical supplies in order to “ensure 
that the poorest and most vulnerable Zimbabweans are able to access the vital 
medicines that they require”. This Emergency Vital Medicines Support aid would 
be managed by UNICEF to “ensure that the money does not pass to the government 
of Zimbabwe.” 83 
As in the case of the UK, DAC donors in general respond to the crisis situations of 
fragile states with increased aid (Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe are all 
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 UK Parliament on 11 December 2006. Daily Hansard – Written Answers. Column 761W. See 
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classified as Fragile States under the DAC’s definition84). As can be seen from the table 
below, 75% of ODA in 2006 benefited just five countries (Afghanistan, Sudan, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Haiti). Approximately half was in the form 
of debt relief (considered to be a non-sustainable form of aid), and not in the form of 
actionable development programs on the ground.  
Figure 7: Total Net Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to Fragile States by Country & Type 
(with/without debt relief) 85 
 
 
3.1.3 Intent Regarding Aid to GAVI-Related Programs 
As stated above, several IFFIm Donor Countries are also direct donors to GAVI. GAVI 
programs are focused on the 70 poorest countries in the world, and these include all of 
the IFFIm Excluded States (see section titled Underlying Intent of GAVI and Partners for 
additional information). GAVI programs funded through sources other than the 
IFFIm are not subject to “high-level tests” linked to IMF debt repayment.  
Presumably, if Donor Countries found the IMF status of a recipient country truly 
relevant, no additional commitments would be made for similar programs in these 
countries through the same organization. For example, while 68% of GAVI’s current 
government funding is IFFIm related, Norway’s commitment to GAVI directly (US$1 
billion) is 37x greater than its IFFIm commitment (US$27 million). 
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Figure 8: Commitments of Donor Countries to IFFIm as of January 200886 
In millions USD, using average 2006 FX (as per Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
Country IFFIm through
GAVI 
Direct through AMC TOTAL
UK 2,544 2026 116 2008 485 3,144
France 1,558 2026 19 2006 -        1,576
Italy 595 2026 -          - 635 1,230
Spain 238 2026 -          - -        238
Sweden 37 2021 67 2008 -        104
Norway 27 2011 1,000 2015 50 1,077
Brazil 20 2026 -          - -        20
South Africa 20 2026 -          - -        20
    SubTotal 5,039$     1,201$    1,170$   7,410
% of Gov't 68.0% 16.2% 15.8%
% of Total 53.5% 12.7% 12.4% 78.6%
Non-Gov't 2,013$    2,013
TOTAL 9,423       
GAVI Funding Sources
 
 
3.1.4 Conclusions Regarding the Intentions of Donor Countries 
IFFIm Donor Countries have provided development aid, humanitarian assistance, 
debt relief and technical assistance to at a minimum the IFFIm Sub-Saharan Excluded 
States, with documented aid flows also to Cuba. Nothing would indicate that Donor 
Countries’ intent when participating in the IFFIm is dissimilar to general intent and 
actions as members of the DAC. 
Despite statements made at the Oslo Innovative Finance meeting (referenced above), 
the IMF Protracted Arrears “high-level test” condition cannot be credibly cited in 
connection with the willingness or ability of Donor Country governments, acting 
either bilaterally or multilaterally, to provide aid and assistance to the IFFIm Excluded 
States. Against this background, accounting classification requirements imposed by 
Eurostat emerge as the primary reason for the Programme’s IMF conditionality. 
Should Donor Countries (or others who join the IFFIm at a later date) decide to 
channel all or most of their vaccination or health-related assistance through the IFFIm, 
countries which in the past have been recipients and depend substantially on these 
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countries’ aid flows could suffer drastic reductions in aid from their top donors. 
Should a similarly conditioned structure be used to finance other development or 
MDG-related initiatives, the “aid orphan” 87 status of IFFIm Excluded States would be 
compounded.  
3.2 Underlying Intent of GAVI and Partners 
In GAVI’s informational and promotional materials, focus is on its mission to “save 
children’s lives and protect people’s health by increasing access to immunization in 
poor countries.” GAVI’s list of eligible countries includes all of the IFFIm Excluded 
States88: 
Figure 9: GAVI Alliance Country Groups and Corresponding Co-Financing Policies89 
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 OECD (April 2007). 
88
 GAVI Alliance (2008) p.37. Importantly, internal documents regarding the selection of GAVI’s domicile notes 
that a US domicile would restrict potential recipient countries given the US Trading with the Enemy Act. 
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 WIDER discussion paper No.2007/01 also lists “Top Priority” MDG 4 countries, including Liberia, Somalia, 
Sudan and Zimbabwe; “High Priority” countries include North Korea.  
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Although GAVI has not approved any programs to date in Somalia or Sudan, 
programs have been approved in the other IFFIm Excluded States.90 Given the IFFIm’s 
critical importance for funding prevention of several major diseases (it represented 
fully 80% of the total amount of funding for measles prevention available to high-
burden countries in 2007, and 90% of the global amount available for mother and neo-
natal tetanus)91, the IFFIm Excluded States may suffer a significant disadvantage in 
these areas. 
Figure 10: GAVI Programs in IFFIm Excluded States92 
Country ISS NVS INS HSS CSO
Cuba - - 01-Jun-05 - -
North Korea 01-Jun-02 01-Jun-02 - 01-Feb-07 -
Liberia 01-Nov-07 12-May-07 01-Nov-05 12-May-07 -
Somalia - - - - -
Sudan - - - - -
Zimbabwe 01-Mar-01 07-Feb-07 - - -
GAVI Programs / Most Recent Board Approval Dates
 
 
It bears repeating that the US$836 million of IFFIm funds that GAVI disbursed by 
year-end 2007 were destined for strengthening health systems (9%), pentavalent (five 
in one) combination vaccines (22%), vaccinating against polio (23%), measles (17%), 
maternal and neonatal tetanus (5%), and other GAVI programs (26%)93. None of these 
programs were able to be carried out in the IFFIm Excluded States with IFFIm funds, 
though it is clear that excluding these countries is not the goal of the GAVI 
organization.  
High level representatives of the many GAVI partners, as well as internationally 
recognized health, human welfare and human rights luminaries are members of the 
numerous Boards, Committees, Working Groups and Task Teams that focus on the 
                                                
90
 GAVI Alliance website at http://www.gavialliance.org/performance/country_results/index.php  
91
 GAVI 2008 Handbook 
92
 GAVI Alliance website. Accessed February 2008  
93
 GAVI Alliance and The World Bank (2007).  
 42 
governance and execution of GAVI’s strategy94. The efforts of all of these individuals 
are based on a good faith effort that can best be summarized by Bill Gates’ statements 
at the IFFIm launch in November 2006 (emphasis added) 95: 
The commitments announced today provide a major boost to GAVI's work to ensure 
that all children - no matter where they are born - have access to lifesaving vaccines. 
The IFFIm will provide major new resources for GAVI to extend the reach of its 
programs. These funds are urgently needed - it's unacceptable that each year, 27 
million children go without immunizations that are taken for granted in rich 
countries. The IFFIm is a bold and innovative approach to financing critical global 
health programs. 
3.3 Underlying Intent of Financial and Legal Advisors 
Structuring a capital markets transaction typically requires thousands of hours of 
effort from a large number of advisors, principally financial and legal, over the course 
of weeks or months. In the case of new or innovative structures, this effort can extend 
to years. For the IFFIm, including the time it took Gordon Brown’s advisors to design 
a preliminary structure (a process which began in 2002) to the time the first Notes 
were issued under the Programme in November 2006, close to 5 years of effort had 
been invested into the design of the structure. This effort included the capital markets, 
structuring, investor sales and internal legal teams within the investment banks that 
managed/co-managed the transaction96, IFAs involved as trustees, paying and transfer 
agents97, and what was likely a full battery of specialized legal professionals98, 
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consultants, independent advisors and rating agency analysts99 (together, “IFFIm 
Financial and Legal Advisors”). 
It is impossible to fully understand the true intent of all of these parties, either as 
individuals or as a group. Judging from comments made publicly and from the goal 
and success-oriented mentality that typically characterizes these professionals, the 
argument is put forth that their concern for improving the access to vaccines for the 
world’s poor was likely significantly tempered by an overriding desire to structure a 
viable and successful capital markets instrument. This definition of success is likely 
centred on the “marketability” or attractiveness of the structure to bond investors100. 
The measure of this success was investors’ decision to take US$1 billion in hand and 
purchase the IFFIm Notes during the first few days after the launch of the transaction 
in November 2006. The following quote bolsters this view (emphasis added): 
The recent IFFIm transaction is a perfect example of how the capital markets can be 
tapped for the public good. Everyone involved in the IFFIm initiative believed 
passionately in what we wanted to achieve. It was a real challenge to create a 
structure appropriate for the donor governments and attractive to the market, but the 
outcome speaks for itself, and we are extremely proud to have been part of it. 101 – 
Michael Sherwood, Co-Chief of Goldman Sachs International  
 
IFFIm Financial and Legal Advisors also had to contend with the issue with which 
most capital markets investors require the greatest amount of comfort: new issuers. In 
this case, not only was the IFFIm structure a true innovation without precedent, but 
GAVI as the central operating entity of the IFFIm, despite its solid track record of 
operating performance since 2000, was unknown in the capital markets.  
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This confluence of novelty required a delicate balance between fulfilling Eurostat’s 
requirements for government accounting purposes, AAA ratings, attractiveness to 
bondholders, and the lowest possible funding costs: by no means an easy task.  
IFFIm Financial and Legal advisers sought to enhance all aspects of the Notes: 
attractive coupon (purchasing what is essentially the diversified if somewhat tainted 
risk of six highly-rated sovereign credits at a coupon rate that is slightly higher than 
the rate a bond investor would achieve by purchasing the straight sovereign bonds102), 
attractive rating (securing the participation of The World Bank, a AAA-rated entity 
with significant experience and international recognition103), visible risk mitigation 
structures (IMF-related conditionality provides credit enhancement to the part of the 
risk that results from recipient countries, since defaults to the IMF are expected by 
rating agencies to occur less frequently than standard sovereign defaults104) and, 
lastly, attractive story (compelling use of proceeds).  
With the current structure, the IFFIm Financial and Legal advisors achieved all of the 
structural requirements: 1) enough uncertainty was introduced to prevent 20 year’s 
worth of pledges from being reflected in Donor Countries’ 2006 fiscal budgets; 2) 
rating agencies awarded the structure the required AAA rating; 3) the Notes were 
priced extraordinarily efficiently105, striking virtually a perfect balance between 
achieving attractive rates for investors and low funding costs for the IFFIm; and 4) an 
unprecedented and highly innovative long-term funding source for international 
development aid was created and successfully launched.  
The fact that only a few countries had to be excluded from benefiting from these 
funds was a necessary result, a ‘collateral damage’, without which the benefits of the 
structure for many millions of others would not have been possible. Realistically, it is 
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difficult to disagree completely with this view. And yet, one wonders whether 
extended conversations with Eurostat could have resulted in different or new 
accounting treatment, or whether in this world of available statistics, another metric 
could have been found that did not have the same discriminatory effects. 
3.4 Underlying Intent of IFFIm Noteholders 
Investors in the Notes were for the most part IFAs106. Because of the regulations under 
which the Notes were issued, they were available for purchase within the U.S. only to 
Qualified Institutional Buyers (or QIBs)107, which presupposes a high level of wealth 
and financial sophistication. Outside the U.S., the Notes could be sold to any “non-
U.S. persons,”108.  
Figure 11: Investors in IFFIm Notes by Investor Type and Region109 
 
In addition to these institutional IFA investors, and “recognizing this combination of 
strong moral purpose and the power to raise finance”110 investors of the Notes 
included also institutions led by the following: His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI, Her 
Majesty Queen Rania Al-Abdullah of Jordan, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the UK’s 
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Chief Rabbi Sir Jonathan Sacks, the Muslim Council of Britain, the Hindu Forum of 
Britain, the Network of Sikh Organisations, and the entertainers-cum-anti-poverty-
campaigners Bono and Bob Geldof, among others (together, “Moral Investors”). The 
following review of statements made by the Moral Investors underscores the 
universality of their intentions (emphasis added): 
The Catholic Church consistently shows its deep concern for the needs of all, 
especially those living in poverty. It is the hope of Pope Benedict that the participation 
by the Church in this programme will help to inspire others to take the step toward 
concrete action.111 Cardinal Martino, Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace 
This is a humanitarian project of the highest order and deserves the support of all who 
care for the future of our world. – UK Chief Rabbi, Sir Jonathan Sacks 
The Muslim Council of Britain welcomes and supports the IFFIm initiative of our 
Government to provide life saving vaccines to some of the world’s most vulnerable 
victims: children in developing countries. While the MCB is pleased to be part of the 
IFFIm, it hopes that further financing structures of similar facilities will become 
Shariah compliant…[the MCB] will donate all revenue generated from its 
participation in IFFIm to charitable causes. - Iqbal Khan, the Chairman of the 
Business and Economics Committee of the Muslim Council of Britain 
Sikhs everywhere will welcome today's exciting launch … to help save the lives of the 
world's poorest children. Sikhs will recognise it as a positive and significant move, in 
line with Guru Nanak's teaching on the importance of 'seva', or service to the less 
fortunate. In purchasing one of the first bonds, the Network of Sikh Organisations is 
confident that many Sikh organisations in the UK will follow in supporting this 
worthy and innovative initiative. - Dr Indarjit Singh, the Director of the Network 
of Sikh Organizations UK 
A letter by Bono to the IMF’s Managing Director regarding debt relief in Liberia (and 
Mr. Rato’s response112) is testament to Bono’s concern for that nation in particular. It 
would be difficult to understand that, as an IFFIm investor, he would be in complete 
agreement with the effects of the IMF ‘high-level test.’ 
In conclusion, while one could potentially assume that IFA investors in the Notes 
were motivated purely by the financial risk/reward elements of the IFFIm Notes and 
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are perhaps unconcerned with the fate of the people living in the IFFIm Excluded 
States, this is clearly not the case with Moral Investors. It seems unlikely that Moral 
Investors would knowingly agree to exclude the poorest of the poor from the benefits 
of having access to these frontloaded funds. Arguably, the fundamental teachings of 
every one of these religiously-motivated investors would seek rather to protect those 
whose situation is most desperate, i.e., those whose governments and economies are 
so dysfunctional that they are unable to keep current on IMF payments. Although this 
does not mean that they would not have invested had they been fully aware of the 
IFFIm’s structural conditions (helping the majority of poor children is better than 
helping none), objections may have been raised based on moral principles, in the same 
manner as the MCB raised its Sharia-related objections to receiving interest on its 
purchased Notes.  
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4. Content: Participants’ Human Rights Obligations 
In a globalized world, it is important though difficult to disentangle the effects that an 
increasingly complex web of relationships and power balances/imbalances can have 
on the realization of human rights of individuals. Many of today’s most important 
(power) relationships do not take place exclusively on the sovereign (State-to-citizen) 
level, where human rights obligations are relatively clearly enshrined in international 
law. As discussed in detail in recent work dedicated to human rights and 
globalization113, today’s reality of interactions includes actors and stakeholders that 
operate through and beyond the sovereign nation state: States may be involved in 
alliances or multi-lateral organizations (such as the European Union or the United 
Nations, etc.), but the responsibilities of these organizations or their commitment or 
obligation to respect, protect and fulfil114 human rights are seldom specifically defined.  
Interactions affecting the rights of millions of individuals also occur between a 
particular State and IFIs and IFAs, or directly between international or domestic 
businesses and private (non-government) individuals. Also, in the case of 
international humanitarian or other aid, development or poverty-reduction measures, 
or alternatively, sanctions, embargoes or other extraterritorial actions, these 
relationships take on an extraterritorial character: i.e., they occur directly between a 
State and non-citizens of that State.115 
Given that only States are signatories to treaties, covenants and other instruments 
related to human rights, any duties comprised therein lie with the sovereigns. A 
surging tide of academic debate suggests that “globalisation has generated a set of 
new duty bearers in the area of human rights, particularly with reference to economic 
and social rights in developing countries. … The new duty-bearers complement the 
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nation-states acting in their traditional role; they do not displace them.”116 However, 
irrespective of who the duty bearers are, rights holders remain the same: individual 
persons. Whether the rights in question are related to civil, political, economic, social 
or cultural matters or whether it is children, women or racial minorities that are at 
issue, it is the effect of others’ actions upon the rights of an individual (or an ethnic 
group) that are of fundamental importance. 
Through the MDGs117, the rights contained in many of the international human rights 
instruments have been synthesized into freedoms and abilities for individuals, and 
have become the world’s goals through 2015.118 These goals for development fit well 
into the evolving concept of what M. Nowak argues is a concept of human 
development that is no longer “defined as economic growth or industrialisation but as 
the full realisation of human rights in the broad sense, ie economic, social, cultural, 
civil and political rights”.119 This shift in concept from development as defined by 
macroeconomic indicators to development as an individual’s daily availability of 
choices and ability to choose is also supported by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya 
Sen’s freedom-approach to development120. Increasingly, development is defined as 
something closer to the antithesis of poverty, which been defined as “the absence or 
inadequate realization of certain basic freedoms or human rights, such as the freedom 
to avoid hunger or disease…”121  
The nexus of human rights and development involves the IFFIm given its explicit 
connection to MDGs 4 (child mortality), 5 (maternal health), and 6 (combat disease).122 
Despite this, the concept of human rights or a human rights based approach to 
development (HRBAD) are completely absent from IFFIm and GAVI materials. 
Nevertheless, the argument can be made that, given recent and increasing focus on 
                                                
116
 Salomon, et al (2007) p.3. 
117
 UN Doc. A/Res/55/2 (September 2000)  
118
 Nowak’s The Three Pillars of the United Nations: Security, Development and Human Rights in Salomon, et al 
(2007) p.31. 
119
 Ibid. p.29. 
120
 Nussbaum (2000), Sen (1999). 
121
 OHCHR (2006). 
122
 Offering Memorandum p.6, GAVI Alliance and IFFIm websites. 
 50 
the process and procedures of development efforts rather than only their outcomes123, 
Donor Countries and representatives of GAVI and its partners should have been 
familiar with the general HRBAD concepts as they relate to poverty reduction124 
(emphasis added): 
As discrimination may cause poverty, poverty also causes discrimination. In addition 
to their race, colour, gender or social origin, the poor are also subject to 
discriminatory attitudes by governmental authorities and private actors because they 
are poor. The twin principles of equality and non-discrimination require States to 
take special measures to prohibit discrimination against the poor and to provide them 
with equal and effective protection against discrimination … the most common 
discriminatory practices deny poor people equal access to fundamental services and 
human rights such as the rights to food, education, health or justice... 
Particularly relevant are also the guidelines suggested by Manby in her 
recommendations to the Human Rights Council regarding non-discrimination 
and “a fairer distribution of global resources (especially those that are limited)” 
both nationally and internationally, particularly when considering the case of the 
IFFIm Sub-Saharan Excluded States.125 
4.1 Human Rights Obligations of Donor Countries 
International human rights law is focused principally on the responsibilities that a 
State has vis-à-vis those living within its territory or under its sovereignty. However, 
because of the fact that the world’s poorest and most disadvantaged now number in 
the high hundreds of millions, some argue that the world community as a whole is in 
a state of “massive and systemic” breach of international human rights law.126 Failure 
to provide minimally acceptable water, nutrition, health, education, and housing 
standards for over one billion persons is difficult to reconcile with the “one State, one 
population” duty-bearer/rights-holder framework of international human rights law. 
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Particularly given the tangled cause-and-effect dynamics of colonization, 
industrialization, and globalization, meeting the systemic challenge of poverty has 
arguably become the responsibility of not only the States sovereign over a particularly 
disadvantaged territory, but of the world community. Many have questioned whether 
a higher standard should be imposed on countries which, by virtue of their 
geographic location or of historical circumstance, have managed to develop and thrive 
beyond most others during the last two centuries. 
In the case of the IFFIm Donor Countries, it is important to note that as members of 
the European Community, these countries are parties to regional human rights 
instruments, particularly the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (ECHR). In particular for the UK, “the 
Department for International Development (and the Secretary of State) are legally 
bound by the Human Rights Act, which incorporates the ECHR domestically”.127 
A review of formal/legal commitments to international human rights law reveals a 
significant commitment to both the concept and the legal instruments which enshrine 
the concept of human rights currently: 
Figure 12: Status of Core International Human Rights Instrument by Donor Country 
Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008
Genocide 
Convention
Elimination of 
Racial 
Discrimination
Civil & Political 
Rights
Economic, Social 
& Cultural 
Rights
Elimination of 
Discrimination 
against Women
Convention 
against Torture
Rights of the 
Child
1948 1965 1966 1966 1979 1984 1989
Total State Parties 140 172 160 156 183 143 189
UK 1970 1969 1976 1976 1986 1988 1991
France 1950 1971 1980 1980 1983 1986 1990
Italy 1952 1976 1978 1978 1985 1989 1991
Spain 1968 1968 1977 1977 1984 1987 1990
Sweden 1952 1971 1971 1971 1980 1986 1990
Norway 1949 1970 1972 1972 1981 1986 1991
Brazil 1952 1968 1992 1992 1984 1989 1990
South Africa 1998 1998 1998 1994 1995 1998 1995
 
Core to the IFFIm, the right to health features prominently as a fundamental right in 
both the human rights discourse generally as well as within several of the core treaties 
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outlined above. Particularly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) focuses on the health-related rights of individuals. Article 
12(1)-(2)(d) underscores: 
States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest available standard of physical and mental health. Steps to be 
taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant … include those necessary for: (a) 
the provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the 
healthy development of the child; … c) the prevention, treatment and control of 
epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; d) the creation of conditions 
which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness. (emphasis added). 
Elements of jurisdiction and cooperation are also important in understanding the 
significance of States’ obligations under the ICESCR.128 Each State Party to the ICESCR 
in Article 2 “undertakes to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical … with a view towards 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.” In contrast, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) details in its Article 2 that each State Party “undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant…” (emphasis added). While the ICCPR sets out 
jurisdictional boundaries for obligations, the ICESCR does not; and while the ICESCR 
clearly requests the cooperation of states to realize the rights it contains, the ICCPR 
does not. 
Common to both covenants, however, and indeed to most human rights instruments, 
is a clear call to equality and non-discrimination, barring distinction (the ICCPR at Art. 
2(2)) and discrimination (the ICESCR at Art. 2(1)) “of any kind, such as [or as to] race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.” Indeed, “the twin principles of equality and non-
discrimination are among the most fundamental elements of international human 
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rights law.”129 The implications for the IFFIm Donor Countries of these and other 
potential areas of obligation are reviewed below.  
4.1.1 Potential Areas of Moral and/or Legal Obligations 
In determining Donor Country obligations, this section will focus on the fulfilment of 
potential obligations incumbent upon advanced donor nations as they themselves act 
in the international arena. Because the extraterritorial nature of human rights 
obligations continues to be a source of significant debate, this determination will 
largely be an exercise in extrapolation rather than reference to precedent or 
established argumentation.  
In the international aid context, potential obligations of donor countries generally 
could include: 1) willingness to engage in international assistance & cooperation; 2) absolute 
adherence to non-discrimination; 3) stringent standards of due diligence; 4) focus on 
conditionality and disintermediation when operating in the global arena; 5) awareness on 
aggregation issues. IFFIm Donor Countries particularly, given the resources, internal 
and external advisors, knowledge, experience and awareness at their disposal, should 
be held to the highest level of compliance with these obligations, each of which is 
explored further below. 
International Assistance and Cooperation: Many of the human rights instruments, as 
well as other fundamental declarations and agreements, including the UN Charter 
(Arts. 55&56) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the 
ICESCR (Art. 2) exhort the international community of sovereign States to assist and 
co-operate with each other. For example, much of the discussion regarding the 
obligations of ‘Third States’ regarding right to education as analyzed by Maija 
Mustaniemi-Laakso130 has direct parallels to the right to health and to the IFFIm. 
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Mustaniemi-Laakso points to the ‘collective commitment’ that States have made to 
the rights underpinning the MDGs (in our case, the right to health and 
immunization). The content of co-operation and assistance is also detailed in 
international human rights treaties, world conferences, and also through the General 
Comments of several Treaty Body Committees, particularly CESCR General 
Comment 14 on the right to health.131 Importantly, in its General Comment 14 
regarding the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the CESCR outlines 
the international obligations related to the right to health132 and often refers to co-
operation between states.  
Non-Discrimination: One of the fundamental provisions of most core human rights 
instruments as well as a cornerstone of the human rights based approach to 
development and most of the academic literature regarding human rights is the 
obligation to maintain equality and non-discrimination. Indeed, the UN Charter 
itself is based on the “equal rights of men and women and nations large and small” 
(Preamble) and “on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members” (Art. 
2(1)). It is perhaps also important to note that the ICESCR’s Article 2 contains both 
the exhortation to cooperation referenced above as its first clause, and in Art. 2(2), its 
call for non-discrimination. In contrast to the non-discrimination Article 2 of the 
ICCPR, there is no mention in the ICESCR that its non-discrimination article should 
be limited a state’s territory or jurisdiction. Further, the CESCR’s General Comment 
14, under “special topics of broad application,” underscores non-discrimination and 
equal treatment as important principles. In the same way that these principles apply 
in domestic policies of the IFFIm Donor Countries, they should apply in the context 
of international co-operation.  
                                                
131
 OHCHR (2006) Guideline 4 includes a full set of ‘technical, economic or other assistance’ references at 
Provisions on the Nature of States’ Obligations in International Human Rights Instruments, as does Guideline 7 
in Provisions on International Assistance and Cooperation in Human Rights Instruments including treaties, world 
conference agreements, and General Comments. 
132
 CESCR General Comments 2, 3, 8, 14; CEDAW General Recommendation 24; CRC General Comment 4. 
 55 
It is not argued that the UK should make its foreign or developmental aid available 
to all countries and all populations at every moment, or that it should not earmark 
its aid to specific purposes or nations. Rather, the argument is that when the UK, 
through the IFFIm, targets funds for a specific cause having to do with human rights 
(in this case, the fundamental aspect of immunization in the right to health), those 
funds should be at least in theory available and accessible for all on a non-
discriminatory basis. In the same way, if the UK targets its funds towards a specific 
country, those funds should be allocated to persons within that country on a non-
discriminatory basis (i.e., to minorities within that country). Further, if the UK 
earmarks funds for the benefit of a specific minority, those funds should be available 
to persons belonging to that minority on a non-discriminatory basis (i.e. to women 
within that minority)  
Mustaniemi-Laakso cites the Human Rights Committee’s (HRC) holdings that State 
parties should not perpetrate violations of Article 2 of the ICCPR (referring to anti-
discrimination) on the territory of another State, “which violations it would not 
perpetrate in its own territory”.133 The CESCR also underscores (emphasis added): 
“[A]rticle 2.2 and article 3 [of] the [ICESCR] proscribe any discrimination in 
access to health care and underlying determinants of health, as well as to means and 
entitlements for their procurement, on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, 
physical or mental disability, health status, sexual orientation, and civil, political, 
social or other status, which has the intention or the effect of nullifying or impairing 
the equal enjoyment or exercise of the right to health.”134 
In the case of the IFFIm, discrimination against individuals on the basis of whether 
or not their governments are in IMF Protracted Arrears could conceivably fit into 
several of the above categories (national origin, property, birth, political or other 
status, etc.). In essence, being born into a country with poor governance is just as 
much a matter of chance than being born female rather than male, and not a 
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condition for which a person should be excluded from receiving aid that is at least in 
theory available to others. The OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in 
Fragile States & Situations specifically underscore that donor states “take into 
account, and act according to” the principles of “avoiding pockets of exclusion” and 
addressing the problem of “aid orphans”.135 Further, the CESCR decouples intention 
from effect, implying that there can be a violation of the Covenant without intent. 
Arguably, IFFIm financing for GAVI programs could fit into the Committee’s 
concept of “means and entitlements” for procurement of underlying determinants of 
health (for example, strengthening a country’s health system, providing 
vaccinations and supporting immunization campaigns). 
Due Diligence: In the IFFIm, the causal link between its conditionality and the 
resulting exclusion of millions of persons from the potential benefits of such a large 
pool of funds is unambiguous. This causality meets Vandenhoe’s test that a 
“reasonable degree of likelihood that certain policies or interventions or agreements 
will impact negatively on the ability of people to exercise their basic human rights 
(and equally whether the ability of the developing state to give effect to its 
obligations domestically will be undermined)”136. Margot Salomon has similarly 
argued that “the familiar due diligence standard” should be “applied in 
determining transnational responsibility and an acceptable global standard of care, 
by questioning whether the states acting singly or jointly could have foreseen that 
their conduct and decisions would lead to these outcomes and whether they could 
have reasonably averted the harm.”137 The IFFIm Financial and Legal Advisors 
found that the IMF-related conditionality was sufficient to achieve the successful 
launch of the Programme.138 But was it necessary? The IFFIm Donor Countries were 
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fully aware of the practical implications of the clause, and it is difficult to decouple 
their assent from responsibility for the consequences.  
Conditionality and Disintermediation: Significant and heated disagreements abound 
regarding the subject of conditionality. Whether relating to debt relief, project 
finance, or broader macroeconomic restructuring packages, conditions negotiated 
between international agents139 and fund-recipient nations have been termed either 
fair and necessary fiscal discipline or have been decried as abusive and usurious. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental precept of this conditionality is that it is, on some 
level, a negotiated structure between two parties. Mustaniemi-Laakso underscores 
that conditionality “tends, by definition, to be a relationship between two unequal 
partners, the donor and the dependent recipient, of which the latter has a limited 
room for manoeuvre in the negotiation of the terms and standards.” 140 Importantly, 
in the case of the IFFIm, the nations most immediately affected by the structure’s 
conditionality are not engaged in the negotiation relationship.  
Employing the international capital markets as a funding source results in complete 
disintermediation of the typical recipient-donor dynamic. While negotiations between 
donors and recipients may indeed be uneven, in the case of the IFFIm, they are 
unilateral. The IFFIm Donor Countries, as both initiators and often also recipients of 
conditionality critique, should arguably be held to a higher standard of 
responsibility regarding the implications of holding one-sided negotiations with 
disadvantaged and absent counterparties. 
Aggregation: The efficiency of the Programme as designed (i.e., gathering funds in 
the international capital markets for further distribution internationally significantly 
widens the scope of IFFIm Donor Country obligations. Much aid and development 
debate (as referenced throughout this paper) typically highlights which, if any, 
particular segments of a particular population may have been disadvantaged by a 
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particular project, aid or development process. Much of this discussion and 
regulation is targeted to the concept of the extraterritorial obligations of one donor 
nation vis-à-vis persons living in a recipient nation, particularly “vulnerable groups 
within the targeted country”.141 The mechanism of the IFFIm takes the conversation 
to a broader global perspective: are there any nations that are being excluded or 
disadvantaged?  
Mustaniemi-Laakso, drawing also from Nowak142, highlights that donor nations 
should ensure that the provision of aid does not adversely affect individuals’ rights 
in other states by, for example, promoting or reinforcing discrimination patterns. 
Policies which may be beneficial to the majority of a population, but are detrimental 
to some (minorities, women, particular ethnic or indigenous groups, etc.) are not 
likely to be viewed favourably in the human rights context. In the case of the IFFIm, 
this exclusion extends to entire countries, rather than population segments. 
Arguably, detecting discrimination at the state level requires far less insight into a 
country’s socio-political dynamics than the exclusion of particular population 
segments and should therefore be an easier standard for donor nations to meet.  
Despite the fact that discrimination against states on the basis of poor governance is 
not a topic of wider debate, drawing parallels between intra-state and inter-state 
discrimination seems appropriate given the implications of structures such as the 
IFFIm, which seek to address the world’s problems with the world’s capital. 
4.1.2 Testing for Responsibility 
Several cases in the European Court of Human Rights143 confirm that while “states do 
not leave their human rights obligations at the door when joining international 
organisations with mandates in other areas of international affairs” these standards 
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tend to drift to the least common denominator and are poorly monitored or enforced. 
In the case of the IFFIm, it is not the intent to try to determine the degree of obligation 
that the Donor States have. Merely, it is to point out whether or not this obligation 
exists at all.  
In the IFFIm, the “least common denominator” may result in a compromise on the 
non-discrimination element of human rights for reasons unrelated to the mission of 
GAVI or the fundamental beliefs of the Donor Country governments. Given their 
international human rights commitments, however, the question arises whether it is 
possible to compromise one of the most basic standard of human rights without 
incurring at least some material level of responsibility. 
In testing for responsibility within the right to education, Mustaniemi-Laakso’s points 
to the elements of ‘actual control or effective jurisdiction’ and ‘causation or attribution’.144 
Based on personal communications, the extensive and detailed engagement of the 
Donor Countries in the Programme structuring easily satisfies the control element. 
Equally, the direct and causal link between the structuring of the Programme and its 
effects as detailed in the sections above is unambiguous.  
In determining human rights related responsibility,145 Vandenhole argues that the 
European Union (EU) as an entity is “at least under a general obligation” to both 
respect and protect economic, social and cultural rights in lesser developed nations. 
Vandenhole also references Fian, Salomon, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, in their suggestion that there is an extraterritorial 
obligation to “support the fulfilment” of economic, social and cultural rights if the 
domestic state is unable to do so “for reasons beyond its control” and 
“notwithstanding the use of the maximum available resources”.146 In the IFFIm, the 
exclusion of some countries’ entire populations is based on criteria that the citizens or 
inhabitants of those states cannot control (i.e., the quality of their state’s governance 
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and/or fiscal inability to repay its debts to the IMF). The Donor Countries’ EU 
membership serves only to heighten their level of responsibility in this regard.  
Though pointing to the impact on individuals and/or specific groups rather than to an 
entire nations’s population, in his review of non-territorially linked covenants, legal 
opinions and Treaty Body147 comments, Vandenhole underscores the concepts of: 1) 
‘obligations erga omnes’ (or obligations towards all humans – rather than to a selected 
few or to a subset); 2) ‘causation of an adverse impact,’ and 3) ‘refraining from direct or 
indirect interference in other countries’ ability to realise rights’.  
These three concepts result in three questions to the Donor Countries within their 
IFFIm roles: 1) is the obligation to fund immunization to the extent possible an 
obligation towards all persons, or only some?; 2) are the impacts caused by the IFFIm 
conditionality adverse (i.e., are the IFFIm Excluded States not in the same situation 
without the benefit of the IFFIm funds as they were before the funds were made 
available148)?; and 3) did the Donor Countries actions directly or even indirectly lead 
to an interference in immunization aid being available to the IFFIm Excluded States? 
While the first and the third question are easily answered149 and point to Donor 
Country responsibility, it is impossible to say with certainty whether the IFFIm 
Excluded States as countries will be adversely impacted in their development given 
their non-access to IFFIm funding. What is clear, however, is that on a relative basis 
(i.e. relative to countries which do have access to IFFIm funds), the IFFIm Excluded 
States are at a disadvantage pre vs. post IFFIm as it regards the amount of 
immunization resources available to them. For certain diseases, such as measles, polio, 
and maternal & neo-natal tetanus (as referenced above in this paper), the IFFIm funds 
comprise 80% to 90% of available global resources. It is difficult to argue that having a 
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hand in diverting such crucial funding sources away from a particular nation is not 
classifiable as an ‘adverse impact’. When Vandenhole concludes that the 
“extraterritorial obligation to respect implies that the EU should refrain from any 
unjustified interference with the enjoyment of an ESC [economic, social or cultural] 
right by individuals in the South”150, he could well be speaking directly about the 
IFFIm Sub-Saharan Excluded States. 
4.1.3 Conclusions Regarding the Human Rights Obligations of IFFIm Donor 
Countries 
In many, if not most, nations, the population can no more control the quality of their 
government than they can the color of their skin or their sex. It is simply too high a 
burden to place on an already desperate people that it should rise up, educate, find 
and elect competent leadership and demand good governance and functioning fiscal 
policies. Italy’s experience, everything over a decade of 100%+ debt to GDP ratios to 
the recent European Court of Justice case over the government’s inability to effectively 
implement waste management plans151, to pervasive calls of corruption within 
government, would indicate that even some of the Donor Countries have substantial 
difficulties in controlling the quality of their governments. It is nearly unconscionable 
to condition immunization aid for children on this basis. Against this backdrop, 
Liberia’s recent emergence from over two decades of IMF protracted arrears is no less 
than miraculous. 
Most of the 100 million persons excluded in the IFFIm Excluded States are unlikely to 
indulge in the luxury of debating the relative merits of the IMF, its fee structures, their 
government’s obligations or the fact that they are in arrears. Most are unlikely to be 
fully aware of the existence of GAVI, its programs, the IFFIm or the capital markets in 
general. How can they be expected to advocate for change to either their 
government’s policies or to the structure of this particular Programme? 
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In this case, one can draw important parallels between the case of economic sanctions 
and the exclusion of access to aid. Again, the case is made that the severity of 
sanctions to be expected when a state is unable to repay IMF dues should always be 
less than those occurring when a state violates norms of international peace and 
security. And yet, based on the CESCR’s General Comment 8, even this more severe 
set of norms should consider seriously the impact on the general population:  
[T]he inhabitants of a given country do not forfeit their basic economic, social and 
cultural rights by virtue of any determination that their leaders have violated norms 
relating to international peace and security. The aim is not to give support or 
encouragement to such leaders, nor is it to undermine the legitimate interests of the 
international community in enforcing respect for the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations and the general principals of international law. Rather, it is to insist 
that lawlessness of one kind should not be met by lawlessness of another kind which 
pays no heed to the fundamental rights that underlie and give legitimacy to any such 
collective action.152 (emphasis added) 
The inhabitants of the IFFIm Excluded States should not automatically forfeit their 
right to have equal opportunity to benefit from IFFIm-funded GAVI programs as a 
result of their governments’ unwillingness or inability to repay the IMF. The IFFIm 
Donor Countries should, in their collective action through the Programme, have paid 
greater heed to the fundamental right of non-discrimination, particularly since the 
discriminatory effects of the IMF Protracted Arrears clause were likely to have been 
evident with even the most basic levels of due diligence.  
While this obligation is likely to be moral rather than legal,153 Vandenhole argues that 
the lack of a jurisdictional clause in the ICESCR makes the document similar in 
structure to the four Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention. Whether or 
not the non-discrimination provisions of the ICESCR and other international 
covenants can take on the same international recognition as the Geneva and Genocide 
conventions, one could certainly argue that the same moral obligation that inspired 
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the creation of the IFFIm should further inspire the IFFIm Donor Countries to redress 
the discriminatory effects of its conditionality. 
4.2 Human Rights Obligations of International Financial Institutions –IMF 
& IBDR 
Secondary to our analysis of Donor Country obligations and responsibilities is the role 
of the IMF and the IBDR (together the IFIs) in the IFFIm structure. Because the 
conditionality clause was included in the structuring not at the request of either IFI, 
the topic of whether the IFIs have human rights obligations in relation to the IFFIm 
becomes a moot point. The concept of conditionality in IFI dealings with individual 
nations is a topic covered extensively by the researchers noted below154, particularly 
Skogly, and is outside the scope of our analysis. 
In essence, both IFIs are “under negative obligations to respect and to protect human 
rights in their own operations through their policies, programmes and projects, and to 
fulfil human rights whenever this obligation stems from customary international law 
and general principles of law.”155 Furthermore, a review of the CESCR General 
Comments by Vandenhole reveals the widely-held view of the human rights 
community that  
“the international financial institutions (IFIs) should pay greater attention to 
economic, social and cultural rights in their lending policies, credit agreements, 
international measures to deal with the debt crisis, structural adjustment programmes 
and development projects… International agencies [undefined] should scrupulously 
avoid involvement in projects which, for example… promote or reinforce discrimination 
against individuals or groups contrary to the provisions of the Covenant”156  
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Tostensen underscores the “continued reluctance (particularly by the IMF) to engage 
in areas that are deemed ‘politically prohibited’ (eg human rights) under their 
respective Articles of Agreement, [though] the IFIs would seem in practice to condone 
the integration of human rights into the PRSPs [Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers]”. 
Despite these (perhaps increasing) concessions to the human rights discourse and 
relevance, there is little accountability or recourse, legal or otherwise, regarding the 
actions of the IFIs or the implications of their considerable influence.157 
Again, the discussion in Vandenhole and in Skogly, relates principally to the effect of 
policies and actions on individuals or groups, and not on entire states. There is no 
mention of the repercussions that certain policies can have on nations that could 
potentially go beyond the direct relationship between an IFI and a counterparty 
nation (i.e., that being in non-compliance with IMF payments could have broader 
implications in terms of aid eligibility158). Particularly under a scenario where 
increasing amounts of development and other aid are sourced from the international 
capital markets, structures that discriminate against or exclude the populations of 
entire nations based on the quality of their governance, or other matters largely 
beyond that population’s control, should be examined in detail.  
Because human rights as a concept of law applies almost exclusively to the behaviour 
of a sovereign nation vis-à-vis individuals or groups within that sovereignty, 
international human rights law does not formally apply to the entities formed by 
groups of nations, despite the fact that it is broadly argued that  
[j]ust as the economic growth of any given country is no longer considered separately 
from the role, and impact of, the outside world … the impact on the enjoyment of 
human rights of actors other than the state acting domestically, such as the IFIs,… is 
such that their various human rights responsibilities cannot be ignored. Yet while 
philosophical and social approaches to responsibilities may have come to terms with 
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these developments, the legal discipline has so far demonstrated some serious 
difficulty in adapting to this new reality… 
IFIs may not have an explicit mandate in the area of human rights, but certainly 
impact on them, and a system of human rights accountability – at least in so far as 
negative obligations would apply – is long overdue.159 
For the purposes of this paper, based on the researcher noted above, IFIs cannot be 
said to have explicit or legal human rights obligations. 
4.3 Human Rights Obligations of GAVI 
Further removed from legal human rights related accountability are the actions of 
GAVI. Because GAVI is a private-public partnership and not an organization formed 
exclusively by sovereign nations (such as the IFIs), it can be held accountable only to 
the extent it does or does not meet its intended purpose. This accountability is not 
related to international human rights instruments, but to GAVI’s mission of 
addressing an issue that is inextricably tied to the MDGs and to the fundamental 
human rights issue of health160. At a minimum, GAVI’s activities and impact should 
be on par with the standards set for international business, whereby “business has a 
responsibility not merely to minimise the negative impact of their ventures on 
society… but in maximising their positive impact,” and that there may be “an 
emerging consensus on the human rights responsibilities of businesses as ‘societal 
actors’’161.  
Until this ‘emerging consensus’ is clarified and, particularly, until it is carried through 
to practical redress in jurisprudence, the human rights related obligations of GAVI 
will remain squarely in the moral category. 
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4.4 Human Rights Obligations of IFAs, Advisors & Investors 
Because only sovereign states formally have human rights related obligations, it 
would be a stretch to argue that the other participants in the structuring and execution 
of the IFFIm Programme have similar duties. The professionals working for the 
investment banks that either managed or co-managed162 the transaction are not subject 
to any regulation that would require them to comply with or even to consider 
international human rights law. Indeed, it is not very likely that any of the 
professionals involved are aware of the existence of international human rights law in 
any detail, though they may be aware of the concept generally. The same can be said 
for the financial actors involved as trustees, paying and transfer agents163, despite the 
tremendous size and global scope of their activities and influence. 
Perhaps a certain minimum level of awareness could be expected from the many legal 
professionals involved in this transaction. Three international top-tier law firms164 
likely devoted thousands of hours to thinking through and developing the framework 
of the IFFIm. Several of the legal partners involved are specialists in supranational 
and sovereign-related capital markets structures. Arguably, these legal professionals 
should be at least familiar in concept with the human rights related obligations of the 
IFFIm Donor Countries, both in the European and international contexts. 
Professional investors, to the extent that they are financial institutions, pension funds 
or similar, will fall into the International Financial Actor definition above (excluding 
the IFIs), and would also be without legal human rights obligations. Moral Investors, 
defined above, are also without legal human rights obligations, though their stated 
intent likely results in a significant moral obligation to at the very least ‘do no harm’. 
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Sorell argues that private actors, on the basis of their “specific and deliberate 
engagement in the national development effort and the influence they exercise on 
local communities and governments derived from negotiated agreements”165 should 
perhaps be subject to norms that mirror the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (hereafter, “Norms”)166. 
The Norms suggest setting standards of human rights obligations that consider the 
broad positive and negative impact of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises167. While the Norms point to the State as the primary duty-bearer with 
regard to human rights, the Preamble highlights that not only do corporations and 
enterprises acting as such, but “their officers - including managers, members of 
corporate boards or directors and other executives - and persons working for them 
have, inter alia, human rights obligations and responsibilities.”  
The Norms focus heavily on the obligation of these entities and persons to “respect 
generally recognized responsibilities and norms contained in United Nations treaties 
and other international instruments,” but to their detriment then go on to list over 35 
treaties and conventions that these persons should be cognizant of, including The 
International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes as well as “conventions 
and recommendations of the International Labour Organization” which number into 
the hundreds. The dilutive impact of all these inclusions is considerable.  
Furthermore, the Norms follow the standard of focusing on either harms or violations 
perpetrated against individuals or groups within nations, but not against entire 
nations as such. So, for example, the norm on non-discriminatory treatment urges 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises to “ensure equality of 
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opportunity and treatment … of the individual … [and] complying with special 
measures designed to overcome past discrimination against certain groups.”  
Admittedly it is a non-sequitur that the UN should ask transnational corporations or 
their officers and directors to engage in business activities in areas of the world that 
are severely dysfunctional and where business investment or activity is simply not 
feasible. Nevertheless, when considering the international nature of the financial and 
legal advisers to the IFFIm, and the obligations to respect that are being formalized in 
the Norms, perhaps a separate norm regarding involvement in the structuring of 
overseas or development aid would be appropriate. This might call for members of 
the legal and financial advisory teams of aid mechanisms to ensure that any exclusion 
from aid availability, particularly of entire nations, not be based on conditions 
unrelated to the need of those nations’ populations for the aid in question. 
Figure 13: Graphical Representation of IFFIm Participants’ Human Rights Obligations 
NATURE of OBLIGATION
LEGAL
MORAL
GAVI
IFAs (particularly IMF)
Donor Countries
NONE
Financial & Legal Advisers
IFI Investors
Moral Investors
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5. Content: Overview of Programme Functions & Governance 
This section focuses on how the different parties involved in the IFFIm Notes interact 
with the practical execution of the GAVI immunization programs that are the IFFIm’s 
‘use of proceeds’. This review is intended to highlight the areas of influence of actors 
with human rights related obligations and duties, and the areas of influence of the 
actors without any such obligations.  
5.1 IFFIm Structure and Timeline Schematic 
The following schematic168 outlines the structure by which grant payments are 
pledged by IFFIm Donor Countries (termed ‘Grantors’ in the Figure below) to the 
IFFIm. These pledges are securitized in the capital markets as Notes. Noteholders 
(which we have defined as either Financial or Moral Investors) purchase the Notes 
and deliver, upfront, funds to the IFFIm. The GAVI Fund Affiliate receives proposals 
from eligible countries, and those that are approved receive funds, either from the 
IFFIm or from other GAVI funding sources. The Treasury Manager (World Bank), in 
the meantime engages in activity that ensures that financial restrictions within the 
Notes structure are being met.169 
Figure 14: Overview of IFFIm Structure and Directional Fund Flows 
 
 
                                                
168
 IFFIm website. 
169
 Including the Gearing Ratio Limit and other provisions contained in the IFFIm Offering Memorandum. For the 
purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to know that the World Bank is engaged in ongoing markets-based 
transactions relating to interest rate and currency hedging as well as periodic monitoring of certain other metrics. 
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In essence, IFFIm Programme activity can be split into two parts: structuring and 
execution. During the structuring phase, the Donor Countries were heavily involved, 
and in the case of the UK, were largely driving structuring activity. The IFFIm 
Financial & Legal Advisors and, probably to a lesser extent, GAVI and the World 
Bank were likely to also have been materially involved in the structuring phase. Once 
the Programme passed to the ‘execution’ or implementation phase, as it did after the 
successful launch of the first Notes, the bulk of the direct activity and influence 
moved from the Donor Countries to the other actors.  
Of all the involved parties, GAVI remains the most active. The World Bank, through 
its treasury activities also remains involved throughout the duration of the 
Programme (i.e. through 2026, when the final amounts pledged by the Donor 
Countries will be paid in as grant payments to the IFFIm), as do the Donor Countries. 
However, their role and influence, as the only actors with legal human rights related 
obligations is no longer direct. The figure below illustrates the actors’ involvement 
during the life of the Programme. Essentially, the direct role of the Donor Countries 
through 2026 is limited to making payments on the scheduled payment dates.  
Figure 15: Actor Participation during IFFIm Programme Timeline (partially illustrative)170 
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 The future issuances of Notes under the Programme (N3 to N10) and the repayment schedule are indicative 
only and are meant to illustrate potential capital markets and the involvement of the various related actors related 
to the Programme (Donor Countries with formal/legal human rights related duties; GAVI, The World Bank, 
Financial & Legal Advisors, and Investors without formal/legal human rights related obligations.). Figures are in 
US$ millions and represent only the author’s estimated issuance/repayment schedule for indicative/illustrative 
purposes. Grant payments expected under Donor Country pledges are based on information on the GAVI Alliance 
website and should be only considered as estimates for illustrative purposes, and therefore subject to material 
change. 
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The timeline above shows the launching of the Programme with the initial Notes 
offering in November 2006 (IFFIm N1). The repayment of these Notes is set to occur in 
November 2011 (solid bar) with the accumulated grant payments received from the 
IFFIm Donor Countries (line graph). The Japanese Notes (N2) issued in March 2008 
and payable in March 2010 (solid bar) are also included. Additional issuances (N3 to 
N10) are also assumed, as well as their repayments (dashed bars).  
While the Donor Countries will continue to be active through seats on GAVI boards 
and other committees, their legal human rights related obligations will be filtered 
through the broader GAVI governance mechanisms. GAVI, as determined in the prior 
section, does not have formal legal human rights duties or responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, Donor Country indirect involvement continues to be meaningful, and 
arguably legally-binding human rights related duties should continue to be relevant. 
5.2 GAVI Oversight and Governance171 
GAVI is the party with the most direct and extensive involvement in the 
implementation of the intended purpose of the IFFIm. This section reviews GAVI’s 
oversight, governance and other activities, and highlights the participation of Donor 
Countries within GAVI.  
GAVI’s four strategic goals (sustainable delivery of immunization and other health 
services; improving vaccine supplies; sustainability of funding for immunization 
programs; and promote GAVI’s public-private partnership model in global health 
initiatives) require substantial infrastructure. GAVI’s immunization programs are 
time-limited, performance-based and seeks sustainability through long-term 
integration with a recipient country’s existing health system. Over 40 countries now 
have multi-year immunization plans172. The effective administration and monitoring 
of such an undertaking necessarily requires the involvement and coordination of a 
                                                
171
 Information from GAVI Alliance website, GAVI Alliance Handbook (2008) and personal communications. 
172
 http://www.gavialliance.org/about/in_partnership/index.php. Accessed March 2008. 
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large group of actors. The composition of the GAVI Alliance Board (which includes 5 
seats for Donor Countries) gives a good indication of the multi-disciplinary, multi-
agency, multi-sector approach that is largely characteristic of GAVI’s activities: 
Figure 16: GAVI Alliance Board Member Composition 
Number Representative from:
1 GAVI CEO (non-voting)
1 WHO
1 UNICEF
1 World Bank
1 Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
5 Donor Countries
5 Developing Country Governments
1 Industrialized Vaccine Industry
1 Emerging Vaccine Industry
1 Civil Society
1 Technical/Research Institute
9 Unaffiliated (not beneficiaries, not donors, not GAVI executives)
28 Total
 
 
Most important for our purposes is an understanding of the funding, monitoring and 
oversight processes conducted by GAVI. The public-private partnership model is 
deeply embedded into all of its policies and procedures. This is evidenced by the 
composition of the members of GAVI’s boards and committees, as well as by the use 
of WHO and UNICEF established practice in much of its reporting and monitoring 
functions. While the governments of fund recipient nations and their national health 
systems play a fundamental role in the organization, data collection and 
implementation of GAVI programs, safeguards are built into the administration of all 
immunization programs. These standards serve to satisfy the requirements of Donor 
Countries regarding funds security, program implementation and oversight. 
Independent and non-government institutions are present in all phases of GAVI 
programming and monitoring. 
A summary of GAVI’s boards and committees is illustrated below: 
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Figure 17: The GAVI Proposal and Monitoring Process173 
 
The monitoring operations carried out by GAVI are the same, irrespective of which 
sources are used to fund a specific program174. The only distinction made occurs once 
proposals submitted to GAVI are approved for funding. At this point, GAVI cannot 
use IFFIm funds to pay for approved programs in the IFFIm Excluded States. Given 
that IFFIm pledges represent 54% of GAVI’s total funding and 68% of its government 
funding, exclusion significantly impacts funds availability and funds quality for 
IFFIm Excluded States175. There is no mention in GAVI or IFFIm documentation of any 
special consideration for IFFIm Excluded States when reviewing project funding, or 
ensuring that similar financing amounts will be available from other sources. In the 
case of potential clean-water bonds or the larger IFF, it is unclear that there would 
even be other resources available apart from those sourced in the capital markets. 
                                                
173
 GAVI is undergoing significant corporate reorganization. On February 2008, the GAVI Alliance Board and the 
GAVI Fund Board merged into a single Swiss entity to be called the GAVI Alliance Board. See 
http://www.gavialliance.org/about/governance/reports/2008_02_26_fund_board_meeting.php  
174
 Sources: personal communications and GAVI Alliance website. For additional detail, see Annex I. 
175
 With IFFIm funding, projects exhausting funds in the middle of a vaccination campaign may ‘borrow’ against 
future IFFIm funding. Source: personal communications. It is unclear whether similar funding flexibility for 
large-scale impact projects will be available for the IFFIm Excluded States from other funding sources.  
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6. Procedure: Identification of Conflicts 
A review of the goals and approaches of IFFIm participants indicates that the only 
parties without meaningful conflicts as a result of the structuring are IFFIm Legal & 
Financial Advisors and IFI Investors. Donor Countries, GAVI and Moral Investors 
face conflicts between their intents and IFFIm conditionality. Donor Countries face 
additional conflicts relating to their legally-binding human rights obligations.  
Figure 18: Summary Overview of Participants’ Goals, Methods, Requirements & Conflicts 
Entity Goal / Intent Approach / Method Requirements Area of Conflict
GAVI
MDG 4: Child Mortality
IFFIm
ADVISORS
DONOR
COUNTRIES
Minimize Execution Risk
Aid Effectiveness
ODA Commitments 
Maximize Investor Appeal
Sustainable Financing
Direct Donations to GAVI
AMC
IFFIm Programme
ODA Direct or Multilateral
IFFIm Programme
No Direct Aid to Suspect Gov'ts
Ratings Support from Gearing 
Ratio Limit
Resolve EUROSTAT Accounting Issue
Ratings Support from IFA Involvement
Issuer Requirements
Focus on Vaccination/Immunization
Accept IMF-Related Clauses
Address Poorest Countries Excludes several Top Priority Countries
Excludes otherwise Eligible Countries
Avoid 3rd Party Corruption
EUROSTAT Accounting 
Excludes otherwise Eligible CountriesDirect GAVI Support
IMF-Related Clauses
HR Duties (non-discrimination, etc.)
World Bank as Treasury Manager
MORAL 
INVESTORS
Comply with own Intent
Support stated IFFIm Intent
Support Marketing Efforts
Purchase Notes
Support Innovative Aid 
Financing
Accept IFFIm Structure & Conditions
IFI 
INVESTORS
Optimize Risk/Reward
Purchase Notes
Support Issuer Intent
Accept IFFIm Structure & Conditions
IMF-Related Clauses
Pledge Conditionality
MDG 5: Maternal Health
MDG 6: Combat Disease
Pledge Conditionality
Minimize Funding Costs
Issuer Intent
Full awareness of conditionality effects?
 
Any capital markets financing instrument will be subject to substantial input from 
financial and legal advisors. Issuers not intimately familiar with the workings of the 
market are likely to defer to their advisors’ guidance. Nevertheless, issuers would do 
well to understand that their motivation and that of their advisors are not completely 
aligned. As in the case of the IFFIm Programme, there are instances where what is 
completely devoid of conflict for an advisor can raise substantial issues for an issuer. 
 75 
 
7. Conclusions: Alternatives & Recommendations 
The normative content of the right to health as described in the CESCR’s General 
Comment 14 leaves very little room for interpretation: it refers to available resources, is 
unambiguous and repetitive in its call for non-discrimination, and highlights as a core 
obligation special care for vulnerable and marginalized groups. The funds harnessed 
through the IFFIm structure for the purpose of immunizing the world’s poor are 
‘available resources’. As such, they should be administered on a non-discriminatory 
basis, and allocated with special focus on the poorest of the poor. As the structure 
stands, expediency and perhaps convenience has introduced an element that 
discriminates precisely against those nations with governments unwilling or simply 
unable to regularize their relationship with the IMF. The populations being governed 
by such governments are literally the definition of ‘vulnerable and marginalized’.  
The Human Rights Committee has held that for States, “it would be unconscionable to 
so interpret the responsibility under Article 2 of the Covenant [on non-discrimination] 
on the territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate in its own 
territory”176. Arguably, this sentiment should all the more apply to Article 2.2 of the 
ICESCR, which does not have a territoriality aspect.  
Government funds within the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Norway are 
available for the basic health and immunization of those inhabitants who have 
defaulted on their debts or are considered criminal. When the funds of these 
governments are made available to the global community for the purposes of 
immunizing children, it is unconscionable to exclude those who are past due on their 
debts or are considered to be outside the recognized international system. 
                                                
176
 Mustaniemi-Laakso in Salomon, et al (2007) pp. 335-338 whereof footnotes 23, 24, 25 and 27 reference a 
wealth of case law and other academic research supporting this viewpoint.  
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It is extraordinarily encouraging to see the development of innovative and efficient 
sources of financing that can be made available to the overwhelming benefit of the 
world’s least developed populations. The IFFIm takes on all the more significance as 
an example of how developed nations can harness the world’s capital to address the 
world’s problems and meet the world’s goals. However, if certain structural elements 
within the IFFIm structure remain unexplored and unaddressed, the populations of 
the world’s most disadvantaged, most alienated and most fragile nations could be 
further excluded from (financial) innovation and progress, even in the context of aid. 
7.1 Limitations 
The principal limitation of this analysis has been my inability to speak with anyone 
within the EUROSTAT office, despite repeated requests directed at different persons 
and departments.  
Questions which remain unconfirmed, since they have not been corroborated by more 
than one source are as follows: 1) how much thought and analysis was given to using 
other metrics which, fulfilling the same requirements as the IMF-related clauses, 
would not have caused the a priori exclusion of the IFFIm Excluded States; and 2) to 
what extent did the internal debate of those involved in the CMFB review the human 
rights implications and effects of the IMF-related conditionality? 
Questions which remain unexplored include: 1) who were the members of the task 
force which met at Eurostat on 06 June 2005 to discuss the issue of the IFFIm 
structure?; and 2) would it have been possible to discuss the creation of a new 
accounting classification for aid-related government pledges that did not require 
conditionality to exclude from the gross national debt classification? 
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7.2 Future Implications 
The IFFIm is clearly a pilot case for larger, more comprehensive development aid 
instruments. In many respects, the structure has been a resounding success, and while 
discriminatory aspects have been left largely unexplored, they are not hidden. The 
parties involved are currently looking into similar or additional capital markets 
instruments to fund other large-scale development projects, as well as other 
instruments that would be open for investment by smaller retail investors177. It is 
precisely because of this success, and the encouragement it gives to the launch of 
similarly structured instruments, that it is of critical importance that discriminatory 
elements within the IFFIm structure be remedied. If future or additional development 
funding instruments perpetuate the discriminatory effect of the IFFIm, the resulting 
impact on the 100 million people living within the IFFIm Exclude States could be 
beyond devastating. 
In the IFFIm, the duties and obligations incumbent upon Donor Countries were 
weakened through conditionality. The goal continues to be the development of an 
instrument whereby human rights obligations do not bend to the pressures of 
accountants or capital markets advisors. 
7.3 Short-Term Recommendations 
Utilizing the capital markets to frontload government development aid and maximize 
impact is an elegant and welcome funding innovation. The following 
recommendations seek only to improve the existing structure and to underscore the 
importance of perfecting this important precedent. The global capital markets are too 
valuable and too efficient a resource to be excluded from the development debate. 
Equally, human rights are too fundamental and important a concept to be 
compromised within the capital markets context.  
                                                
177
 Personal communications. May 2008. 
 78 
It is important also to note that any amendments to the current IFFIm Programme will 
carry a cost. Existing Noteholders must agree to changes in structure and 
documentation must be changed, etc. The complexity (and expense) involved are 
likely to increase to the extent additional Notes are issued under the existing 
Programme and the bondholder base expands. Nevertheless, such ‘bondholder 
consent solicitation’ procedures are by no means unprecedented. 
 Recommendation ST-1: Replace IMF-linked Conditionality. Whether or not 
Somalia, Sudan or Zimbabwe clear their IMF Protracted Arrears, or Cuba or Norht 
Korea enter the IMF has no impact on whether or not the UK or France will over 
time honor its pledges to IFFIm bondholders. If anything, the existing 
conditionality increases rather than decreases bondholder risk, tainting donor 
country with recipient country risk. To the issue of fulfilling Eurostat accounting 
requirements, either Eurostat’s accounting classification of this type of 
commitment should change (i.e., allow for a new category) or pledge 
conditionality should be introduced through another measure.  
One potential metric could be based on GAVI’s performance of its stated goals 
(i.e., pledges are reduced if GAVI does not implement its mission according to 
Donor Country expectation). GAVI has in place substantial monitoring, 
governance and reporting mechanisms that should provide regulators with 
comfort that the performance metrics chosen are not subject to manipulation. The 
rating agencies (and the market) would have to shift their analysis to GAVI’s 
creditworthiness and performance, which have heretofore not been the subject of 
much review, despite the fact that GAVI is the true beneficiary and executor of 
Donor Country pledges. As GAVI continues periodic reporting, its credit profile 
and performance will become increasingly familiar to both rating agencies, 
bondholders and the capital markets in general.  
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Alternatively, any one of a thousand economic or human development indicators 
could be found to replace IMF Protracted Arrears. The critical issue would be that 
conditionality is based on a ‘positive’ rather than a ‘negative’ metric. For example, 
to the extent that recipient countries’ immunization rates rise (or GDP or life 
expectancy or ODA from non-IFFIm Donor Countries, etc.), then Donor Country 
pledges may decrease based on the same weighted percentage as exists within the 
structure today. In this way, conditionality is introduced, but no countries are 
included from the outset of the Programme. Importantly, Donor Country pledges 
only decrease to the extent that the overall situation in recipient countries becomes 
better and not worse. The Gearing Ratio Limit, as it exists today, would continue to 
protect bondholders’ principal and interest. 
 Recommendation ST-2: Add Sharia and Non- or Partial-Repayment Option. 
Given the global and philanthropic appeal of the Programme, and the intentions 
and obligations of GAVI and the Donor Countries, it would seem appropriate to 
allow Noteholders to choose whether or not they require interest payments or 
even repayment of principal invested.  
It would not be beyond the administrative scope of established bond issuance 
practice to allow noteholders to have a certain amount of optionality at their 
discretion. Convertible bonds, for example, are often convertible into other 
securities at the bondholder’s option – a mechanism that is monitored and 
administered by the IFI holding the position of Trustee or other Agent (in the case 
of the IFFIm, Citicorp, Citibank and/or Dexia). Not only would the Sharia option 
be an clear invitation to Muslims everywhere to participate in the offering, as 
suggested by Iqbal Kahn of the Muslim Council of Britain, it would free up 
substantial funds for the funding of additional vaccination and immunization 
programs.  
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Equally, giving investors the option to receive only a portion or indeed none of 
their principal at maturity could potentially also free up significant amounts of 
capital to fund programs (for example, if only 10% of current investors in the 
Notes decided they did not require their principal to be repaid, an additional 
US$120 million would currently be available to fund GAVI programs). This option 
becomes all the more significant as more Notes are issued under the Programme 
and Donor Countries increase or make new grant pledges to the IFFIm. The 
partial-or-no repayment option would also potentially encourage the participation 
of additional segments of philanthropic investors. Opening up a sector of the 
capital markets where investors were not expecting repayment or return, but are 
concerned primarily with reporting and performance has larger implications that 
are part of a longer-term recommendation explored below. 
7.4 Long-Term Recommendations 
For the sake of brevity, the following long-term recommendations have been noted, 
though not fully explored. 
 Recommendation LT-1: Formal Complaint under Proposed ICESCR Optional 
Protocol.178 States parties to the ICESCR include all of the IFFIm Excluded States 
except Cuba. Article 9 of the proposed Protocol allows the Committee to “receive 
and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another 
State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant.” To the extent the 
relevant parties are parties to the Protocol, an inter-state complaint should be 
brought to request the current IFFIm structure be amended or that other remedy 
be agreed. Initiating an inquiry and receiving the Committee’s views would be 
helpful in clarifying certain aspects of the interaction between human rights and 
capital markets funding of development aid. 
                                                
178
 De Albuquerque (2008) A/HRC/8/WG.4/3 Article 9. 
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 Recommendation LT-2: Utilizing Capital Markets Infrastructure for 
Philanthropic or Aid Purposes. Existing international capital markets 
‘infrastructure’ (investment advisors for the corporate and the retail segment, 
reporting requirements, credit analysis, dedicated research, enhanced electronic 
information access, etc.) should extend to the aid and not-for-profit sector. 
Substantial benefits could result from NGOs and development aid organizations 
being subject to the reporting discipline and market scrutiny afforded publicly 
traded companies. Ideally, persons or entities making investments in stocks, 
bonds, mutual funds and indices could utilize the same platform for making 
philanthropic donations or pledges through ‘donation shares’ in exchange for 
receiving regular reporting information and access to comparative research179. 
                                                
179
 Some entities, such as New Philanthropy Capital in London are already successful in actively researching, 
analyzing and comparing the performance of UK charities.  See http://www.philanthropycapital.org.  
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Annex I: GAVI Oversight Procedures 
Inter-Agency Participation: all aspects of a government’s involvement, with the 
possible exception of applying for funds, requires the participation of outside 
partners. The in-country process must also involve civil society organizations in the 
implementation of GAVI programs. Review of programmes is carried out by an 
interagency committee (see below). 
Committee Review: Two committees are engaged in each country that receives GAVI 
funding for programs. Both the Interagency Coordinating Committee and the Health 
Sector Coordinating Committee in each country involve government health officials 
as well as senior members of GAVI partners (UNICEF, WHO, etc.) and members of 
civil society and non-governmental organizations. The mission of these committees is 
to participate in preparing the country annual reports, review and monitor any issues 
raised by the data quality auditors, and review the execution of annual work plans, 
provide records of their deliberations, and similar. These annual reports and other 
country committee reports are then reviewed and monitored by the GAVI 
Independent Review Committee, which is formed entirely of independent experts and 
is tasked with reviewing new proposals and annual country reports. 
GAVI Oversight: oversight of all programs and procedures is carried out by the GAVI 
Secretariat, the GAVI Independent Review Committee, and the GAVI Alliance Board 
(GAVI Alliance Board and GAVI Fund Board) and GAVI Working Groups (Regional 
Working Groups are made up of technical experts from GAVI partners and seek to 
represent the interests of particular countries in GAVI’s global decision-making 
processes and the GAVI Working Group, also formed by technical experts from GAVI 
partners and charged with monitoring implementations of any decisions taken at the 
GAVI Board). 
GAVI Monitoring and Evaluation Requirements: “GAVI support is subject to strict 
performance monitoring.”181 This monitoring takes the form of three mandatory 
measures: 
o Annual Progress Reports: reporting is submitted annually together with a 
WHO/UNICEF Joint Reporting Form182 and dedicates a specific section to detailing 
the receipt and use of GAVI funds, in addition to other program monitoring 
sections. Failure to submit annual progress reports in a timely fashion may result 
in interruption of funding support. 
                                                
181
 From the GAVI Alliance Handbook 2008, p.63. 
182
 See http://www.who.int/immunization_monitoring/routine/joint_reporting/en/index.html. Accessed April 2008. 
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o Vaccine Management Assessments: are required for countries receiving new or 
underused vaccines. These assessments may be conducted using the 
WHO/UNICEF Effective Vaccine Store Management Tool183. 
o Data Quality Audits: recipient governments must allow data quality auditors to 
inspect reporting systems during the second year of GAVI support (or one year 
after approval for re-applicants). The audit team includes two external auditors 
selected by GAVI and two internal auditors selected by the government. These 
audits are carried out according to the standard WHO procedure for data quality 
audits and costs are covered by GAVI. Audit methodology includes checking data 
accuracy, recording and reporting practices (district, regional and central levels), 
as well as checking the accuracy of existing tally sheets, monthly reports, 
tabulations and ledgers. In addition, the auditors will observe immunisation 
sessions taking place and will enter their observations and information 
independently and daily into laptop computers which will then aggregate the data 
and provide reporting for both GAVI and the country’s interagency coordination 
committee. Insufficient data accuracy will result in that country’s either 
conducting a coverage survey (again, using standard WHO cluster survey 
methodology) and/or the formulation and execution of that country (together with 
its interagency coordination committee and regional working group) of a plan to 
improve its reporting system. 
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 http://www.who.int/vaccines-documents/DocsPDF05/IVB_04_16-20.pdf. Accessed April 2008. 
